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ABSTRACT: Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs) adopt the look of medical
practices—complete with workers in scrubs, ultrasound machines, and invasive
physical exams—to deceive pregnant women into thinking they are being treated
by licensed medical professionals. In reality, CPCs offer exclusively Biblebased, non-objective counseling. Numerous attempts to regulate CPCs have
faced political roadblocks. Most recently, in NIFLA v. Becerra, the Supreme
Court held that state efforts to require CPCs to disclose that they are not
medically licensed are unconstitutional violations of CPCs’ First Amendment
right to free speech. In the wake of that decision, pregnant women in crisis—a
disproportionate percentage of whom are low-income women, minority women,
or women in vulnerable or dangerous situations—continue to be subject to
CPCs’ ideological marketing, masquerading as medical advice.
This Article employs tort law to offer a novel way to regulate CPCs’ deceptive
practices. It proposes that women who submit to physical exams or ultrasounds
under CPCs’ false pretenses could successfully raise a battery claim. The
intimate touching of a woman would most certainly be considered objectively
offensive, and while the woman might technically consent to the touching, this
consent is meaningless if it is based on misrepresentations. Contrary to popular
understanding, the touching need not be intentionally malicious or result in
physical injury to the plaintiff.
This Article makes two contributions to the literature. First, it provides a
practicable, novel solution to an urgent and timely issue. By relying on private
causes of action, this Article’s proposal sidesteps the collective action problems
and political willpower obstacles that have long hampered larger-scale attempts
† Teneille R. Brown is a Professor of Law at the S.J. Quinney College of Law and an adjunct Professor
of Internal Medicine at the University of Utah. This research was made possible, in part, through
generous support from the Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence.
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to regulate CPCs. It places the injured woman in the driver’s seat and allows her
to be compensated for the dignitary harm imposed when CPCs use deception to
gain access to her body. Second, this Article contributes to robust literatures in
torts, informed consent, and medical ethics by reinforcing an increasingly blurry
line between medicine and pseudo-medicine. Informed consent means
something; it is not merely a vehicle through which ideology can be shoehorned.
Where CPCs are not licensed, they should be sued for battery, which honors the
individual’s dignity and is not deferential to an industry standard of care.
Physicians should be allowed to have political voices. So, too, should pro-life
activists. But each should have their policy debates, and win or lose them, in the
political sphere. It does violence to the physician-patient relationship, and the
trust that it requires, when this relationship is leveraged for ideological gains.
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INTRODUCTION
Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs) are nonprofit agencies that purport to
provide free services to women who are considering terminating their
pregnancies. However, their “paramount, and typically undisclosed, mission is
to convince women not to have abortions.”1 CPCs engage in deliberate efforts to
mislead pregnant women.2 They hold themselves out as secular medical

1. Kathryn Gilbert, Commercial Speech in Crisis: Crisis Pregnancy Center Regulations and
Definitions of Commercial Speech, 111 U. MI. L. REV. 592, 592 (2013).
2. “False and misleading advertising by clinics that do not provide abortions, emergency
contraception, or referrals to providers of such services has become a problem of national importance.
This issue has been the subject of a congressional report and proposed federal legislation. . . . The
congressional report found that certain pregnancy resource centers ‘frequently fail to provide medically
accurate information’ and that ‘the vast majority of pregnancy centers’ contacted during the
investigation misrepresented the medical consequences of abortion. The report further concluded that
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providers, claiming in their advertising to counsel pregnant women on the full
range of their reproductive options. CPCs buy Google ad-words like “abortion
services”3 to direct people to their facilities. Their websites feature images of
nurses wearing scrubs and standing in front of ultrasound equipment.4 When you
visit the CPC, its lobby resembles that of a health clinic.5 CPCs have names like
“Obria Medical Clinics” or the “Bakersfield Pregnancy Center.”6 The exam
rooms resemble those of doctors’ offices. Before you see a volunteer, you are
asked to fill out paperwork, channeling the procedure you would experience
before seeing a doctor. To complete the presentation that this is a medical
facility, some CPCs even refer to those who seek their services as “patients.”7
Given this quite deliberate staging, one would be forgiven for thinking that
CPCs are ordinary medical clinics. However, CPCs have a different purpose,
which is primarily to counsel against abortion.8 They are different in terms of the

while ‘[t]his tactic may be effective in frightening pregnant teenagers and women and discouraging
abortion [,]’ it ‘denies [them] vital health information, prevents them from making an informed decision,
and is not an accepted public health practice.’” See First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1268
(9th Cir. 2017). See also B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 43 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 59, 64 (2015) (“Numerous reports have indicated that some CPCs use deceptive tactics to
dissuade women from choosing abortion, such as providing false information about the risks and effects
of abortion, providing false information about the law and availability of abortion, and telling women
that their pregnancies are more advanced than they really are.”).
3. Press Release, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, In Response to NARAL Pro-Choice America,
Google Removes Deceptive Anti-Choice Ads from Search Engine (Apr. 28, 2014),
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/press-releases/2014/pr04282014_google_cpc.html
[https://perma.cc/WB8H-9E5L] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). See also Press Release, NARAL PROCHOICE AMERICA, 66,608 Americans Call on Yellowpages.com and Superpages.com to Stop Allowing
Deceptive Anti-Abortion Ads (July 6, 2010),
http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2010/07/07/66608-americans-call-yellowpagescom-andsuperpagescom-stop-allowing-deceptive [https://perma.cc/WRU3-LXAH] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
4. “Well, they are advertising themselves. I looked at one -- a few of them. An exemplary of this is
the Fallbrook Pregnancy Resource Center website. And it’s -- I’m fairly sophisticated -- there is a
woman on the home page with a uniform that looks like a nurse’s uniform in front of an ultrasound
machine. It shows an exam room. The text of the page titled ‘Abortion’ says Fallbrook will educate
clients about different abortion methods available, and describe in medical terms different abortion
procedures. The website also says clients will be evaluated by nurses and that they follow all HIPAA
regulations, which if they’re not a medical provider, they don’t have to follow If a reasonable person
could look at this website and think that you’re giving medical advice, would the unlicensed notice be
wrong?” Oral Argument at 13:33, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
5. Alice X. Chen, Crisis Pregnancy Centers: Impeding the Right to Informed Decision Making, 19
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 933, 934 (2013)
6. See OBRIA MEDICAL CLINICS OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, https://omcsocal.org/
[https://perma.cc/4G86-RT5W] (last visited Dec. 25, 2018); BAKERSFIELD PREGNANCY CENTER,
http://www.bpcpartners.org/ [https://perma.cc/9W7X-UC9C] (last visited Dec. 25, 2018).
7. “[Alternatives Women’s Center] refers to those who seek its services as ‘patients.’” A Woman’s
Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1187 (E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 669 F.
App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016).
8. Danielle Lang, Truthful but Misleading? The Precarious Balance of Autonomy and State
Interests in Casey and Second-Generation Doctor-Patient Regulation, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1353,
1390 (2014).
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training and licensure their staff is required to receive, which is usually none.9
They are different in terms of the privacy and safety standards that are imposed
upon them by law, which are few.10 As of June 2018, they are different in terms
of the First Amendment protection they are afforded, which is considerably more
than that afforded to medical clinics. And, because of all of this, they are different
in terms of their lack of accountability when they injure women. Actual medical
clinics have safety, training, and compelled disclosure requirements that do not
apply to pseudo-clinics like CPCs.
CPCs are typically funded by Christian organizations as well as state and
local governments.11 In some cases, CPCs are subsidized by federal block grants
that were developed to aid poor families.12 The counseling CPCs provide is
exclusively pro-life and “Bible-based.”13 Many CPC volunteers see their job as
a religious ministry or calling to do whatever is necessary to convince women to
carry their pregnancy to term.14
There have been several investigations of CPCs—some from the ivory halls
of Congress and some from the glossy pages of Cosmopolitan magazine—
revealing widespread deceptive CPC practices. In one instance, after asking a
pregnant woman to submit urine for a pregnancy test, the staff then spent 45
minutes going over Bible verses, adoption options, and inaccurate descriptions

9. Most CPCs are unlicensed facilities and are staffed by volunteers who are not licensed medical
professionals. Beth Holtzman, Have Crisis Pregnancy Centers Finally Met Their Match: California’s
Reproductive Fact Act, 12 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 78, 83 (2017).
10. Given that CPCs are not considered professional medical providers, they would not be
subjected to medical malpractice, and held to a professional standard of care, for their negligence.
Instead they would be held to the lower, “ordinary” negligence standard. Additionally, the many state
and local safety ordinances that apply to health clinics—that regulate facilities, licensure, and staffing—
do not apply to CPCs. Finally, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act requires that
health care providers receive authorization before sharing protected health information with a noncovered entity. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.500 (West 2018). Given that CPCs are not “covered entities,” the
privacy protections HIPAA affords would not protect pregnant women who visit CPCs, unless the CPC
voluntarily complies with HIPAA (which could not be enforced by the U.S. government).
11. “[Real Alternatives, a CPC, has] advised Florida, Minnesota, Nebraska, and North Dakota in
establishing state-financed anti-abortion centers, and it helped establish Texas’s multimillion-dollar
program, which runs on the same model [as Pennsylvania’s]. In 2014, Real Alternatives won a no-bid
contract to operate Michigan’s burgeoning program.” Meaghan Winter, What Some Pregnancy Centers
Are Really Saying to Women with Unplanned Pregnancies, COSMOPOLITAN (July 14, 2015),
http://www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/news/a43101/pregnancy-centers-august-2015/
[https://perma.cc/8Q5T-XG7S] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
12. ThinkProgress issued a report in 2016 that revealed that many CPCs are funded, in part,
through state welfare programs. See Bryce Covert & Josh Israel, The States that Siphon Welfare Money
to Stop Abortion, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 3, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/tanf-cpcsec002305dd18/#.jllccm8ij [https://perma.cc/GU2R-J6RE] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
13. See, e.g., THE AM. ASS’N OF CHRISTIAN COUNSELORS, https://www.aacc.net
[https://perma.cc/BUF3-TWE8] (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). See also Callie Beusman, How AntiAbortion Zealots Pose as Medical Professionals to Trick Pregnant Women, BROADLY (May 30, 2017),
https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/pae9ak/how-anti-abortion-zealots-pose-as-medical-professionalsto-trick-pregnant-women [https://perma.cc/6DVR-2LUG] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
14. See, e.g., PRESBYTERIANS PRO-LIFE (PPL), http://www.ppl.org/index.php/ministryequipping/ministry-development/crisis-pregnancy-ministry [https://perma.cc/3BDN-Y7HZ] (last visited
Nov. 19, 2018).
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of the embryo’s development in ways that would humanize the fetus. The
pregnant woman recounted how “[t]he nurse really, really slowed down during
the fetal pain part. She said, ‘[h]ere are the fingertips. The baby feels everything
you’re feeling . . . .”15 During the sonogram, the nurse said the images were not
clear and she needed to do a transvaginal ultrasound. According to the woman,
the nurse “didn’t explain anything or say, ‘We’re going to stick this cone inside
you.’”16
In another instance, a Manhattan CPC kept delaying the return of a pregnant
woman’s laboratory results. The CPC insisted she return week after week for
various and vague reasons. When this woman became agitated about the delays,
she was incorrectly told “not to worry because she could get an abortion in New
York at any time.”17 She eventually went to an obstetrician in severe distress,
seeking a late-term abortion that was no longer legal and no longer possible. She
sobbed with her obstetrician, who felt powerless to help her.
While these instances may constitute fraud, in many cases the counseling
takes on a subtler form of deception. Staff are instructed to use fear tactics and
to provide medically unsound information, such as claiming that undergoing an
abortion heightens the risk of breast cancer or decreases a woman’s fertility.18 In
some states, legislatures have cooperated with pro-life organizations to create
mandatory disclosure “informed consent” laws that require physicians, but not
CPCs, to provide clinically inaccurate information19 (such as the above comment
that in the first trimester “the baby feels everything you’re feeling.”). These
informed consent statutes have been referred to as targeted regulation of abortion
providers, or “TRAP” laws.

15. There is no evidence that a 6-8 week fetus can feel pain. María J. Mayorga-Buiza,
Letter to the Editor, Can fetus feel pain in the second trimester? Lessons learned from a sentinel event,
34 CHILD NERVOUS SYSTEM, 195, 195 (2018). Even so, CPCs share this inaccurate information with
pregnant women. Winter, supra note 11.
16. Id.
17. Dr. Anne Davis, MD, Remarks at Medical and Legal Aspects of Targeted Regulation of
Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws Symposium (Dec. 1, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=leH4_ODKoLA [https://perma.cc/5X64-5AQC] (last visited Nov.
19, 2018) (Speaking about a patient she saw in New York, who was repeatedly told that she could “get
an abortion at any time in New York, and to keep coming back to the CPC.”).
18. “[One study found] that approximately 87% of the centers contacted provided false or
misleading information about the health effects of an abortion, including information about a link
between abortion and breast cancer, the effect of abortion on future fertility, and the mental health
effects of abortion. The second report cited was a January 2008 report by the NARAL Pro–Choice
Maryland Fund. NARAL sent volunteers into [CPCs] in Maryland, including Centro Tepeyac, and
found that every center visited provided false or misleading information, including ‘false information
about abortion risks, misleading data on birth control, and emotionally manipulative counseling.’”
Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 5 F. Supp. 3d 745, 749 (D. Md. 2014).
19. See generally Lois Shepherd and Hilary Turner, The Over-Medicalization and Corrupted
Medicalization of Abortion and its Effect on Women Living in Poverty, 46 J. LAW MED. & ETHICS 672
(2018); see also Michele Goodwin, The Pregnancy Penalty, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 17, 19 (2016).
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Informed consent TRAP laws have been largely upheld as constitutional
regulations on professional speech. One of the key issues that this Article will
address is the disparate treatment of licensed and unlicensed medical providers
in the context of abortion. While physicians can be compelled to provide
medically inaccurate or misleading information to patients because they are
professionals, CPCs cannot be so compelled, because they are not professionals.
This paradoxical treatment leaves pregnant women vulnerable to harm and
obscures the distinction between medicine and pseudo-medicine.
To be sure, not every woman is tricked by CPC tactics.20 At some point, a
sophisticated woman may realize the advice she is receiving is peculiar: it is not
balanced, secular, or objective, as it should be.21 She might then conclude that
this “clinic” is really an elaborate theatrical set for deception. However, because
CPCs target under-insured, under-educated, and low-income women,22 they
often encounter women who are not as equipped to ferret out the pseudo-clinical
from the clinical. Indeed, low-income women of color might be particularly used
to the public social judgment that has come with many of their life “choices.”23
These women unfortunately may be accustomed to receiving patronizing and
directive counseling from someone who should be unbiased and neutral. It makes
sense then, that undercover investigations have documented that many pregnant
women who visit CPCs actually think that the advice they are receiving is
medical and measured against an industry standard of care.
The consequences of this misinformation for the pregnant woman’s health
are astronomical, as the CPC postpones necessary clinical treatment. Treatment
during pregnancy is extremely time-sensitive, and “[p]rompt obstetric
interventions are crucial to prevent intrapartum- related fetal hypoxic injury and
maternal morbidity and mortality associated with obstetric emergencies.”24

20. “This is B.S., Nicole kept thinking, but you’re trying to make me think it’s true . . . . Some
women arrive at those centers in search of Christian counseling or free diapers, but the vast majority are
looking for professional advice to help them navigate unplanned pregnancies.” Winter, supra note 11.
(italics in original).
21. See, Thomas R. McCormick, D.Min., Spirituality in Medicine, Ethics in Medicine
University of Washington School of Medicine, available online at
https://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/spirit.html ; (“Professional ethics requires physicians to not
impinge their beliefs on patients who are particularly vulnerable when seeking health care. .
22. “CPCs specifically target low-income communities, minority populations, and places with
young, vulnerable women, like high schools and colleges.” Brittany A. Campbell, The Crisis Inside
Crisis Pregnancy Centers: How to Stop These Facilities from Depriving Women of Their Reproductive
Freedom, 37 B.C.J.L. & SOC. JUST. 73, 76 (2017). See also N. 19 46 J. LAW MED & ETHICS 672, 677. .
23. “[P]oor women’s private lives are made available for state surveillance and problematization . .
. private information about women’s health and economic statuses is gathered and recorded. Their diets
are quantified and censured. Their histories with substance abuse, sexual abuse, public assistance, and
any form of contact with the state are considered significant and relevant. In essence, a poor, pregnant
woman’s privacy interest—that is, her interest in preventing the government from intruding into her
personal, intimate affairs—has been violated.” Khiara M. Bridges, Poor Women and the Protective
State, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1619, 1622–23 (2012).
24. G. Justus Hofmeyr et al., Obstetric Care in Low-Resource Settings: What, Who, and How to
Overcome Challenges to Scale Up?, 107 INTL. J. GYN. & OBSTET. S21, S21 (2009).
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Pregnant women can have significant health risks that, if undetected, can lead to
the death of the woman, the fetus, or both.25 Of course, receiving pseudo-clinical
care also jeopardizes a woman’s trust and confidence in the larger health care
establishment, as the clinic is no longer exclusively a place for objective health
information. This can negatively affect her relationship with medical providers
for the rest of her life.
The explosion of CPCs has been attributed to Birthright International, a CPC
network organization that was founded in 1968 and has over 400 chapters on
three continents.26 Most CPCs in the United States are linked with an umbrella
organization such as Birthright, Care Net, Heartbeat International, or the
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (“NIFLA”). These umbrella
organizations are Christian and provide leadership and support to thousands of
CPCs. NIFLA, for example, states on its website that it is a
Christian ministry that seeks to glorify God by proclaiming the sanctity of
human life, both born and unborn. Through the provision of legal resources
and counsel to charitable faith-based Pregnancy Resource Centers (PRCs)
and Pregnancy Medical Clinics (PMCs), NIFLA seeks to develop a network
of life-affirming ministries in every community across the nation.27
While these websites eventually disclose the religious mission of the CPCs, inperson visits often do not provide the same transparent disclosure.
There are thousands of CPCs in the United States.28 This is a national, largescale campaign. Heartbeat International, a Christian organization that started out
as a telephone hotline and developed into a system of CPCs, currently “serves
1,800 affiliated pregnancy help locations, maternity homes, and non-profit
adoption agencies on all 6 inhabited continents.”29 In the United States, CPCs

25. Andrew Healy et al., Early Access to Prenatal Care: Implications for Racial Disparity in
Perinatal Mortality, 107 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 625, 625 (2006) (“The establishment of
regularly scheduled medical visits for pregnant women represents one of the most important advances in
obstetric care in the past century, and its role in reducing fetal death is well established.”). See also
Pregnancy and Prenatal Care, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/healthcommunication/toolstemplates/entertainmented/tips/PregnancyPrenatalCare.
html [https://perma.cc/2DCL-XXN9] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018) (“Each year, reports of approximately
500 women who died as a result of a pregnancy-related complication are received by the Division of
Reproductive Health at CDC. There are probably up to 500 additional such deaths that are not identified
as being caused by pregnancy.”).
26. See Discover Birthright, BIRTHRIGHT INT’L, http://birthright.org/learn/ [https://perma.cc/5447NVCP] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). See also Chen, supra note 5, at 935-36.
27. About NIFLA, NIFLA, https://nifla.org/about-nifla/ [https://perma.cc/JUG5-6TM3] (last visited
Nov. 19, 2018).
28. Laura Bassett, What Are ‘Crisis Pregnancy Centers,’ And Why Does The Supreme Court Care
About Them?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/crisispregancy-centers-supreme-court_us_5a09f40ae4b0bc648a0d13a2 [https://perma.cc/4ZZZ-QNM3].
29. Our Story, HEARTBEAT INT’L, https://www.heartbeatinternational.org/about/our-story
[https://perma.cc/J5K6-3UX2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
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now outnumber abortion clinics 3-to-1, though this number is likely an underestimate.30 In some states, the ratio is more like 10-to-1.31
While the stated missions of these organizations appear charitable, and
women benefit from the CPCs’ provision of free diapers or pregnancy tests, their
practices are quite deceptive. Film documentaries, non-profit investigations,
investigative journalism, and a 2006 Congressional report, commissioned by
Senator Waxman (the “Waxman Report”),32 have demonstrated that the aim of
CPCs is to lure vulnerable, under-insured or uninsured women away from
abortion clinics.33 Given the ideological importance of their mission, CPC staff
openly endorse misleading women if it means that fewer abortions will be
performed.34 The success of CPCs is measured and marketed in terms of how
many women they can persuade to carry their pregnancies to term.
To further confuse pregnant women, CPCs are typically located just a few
blocks from clinics that do counsel on and provide abortions.35 Some CPCs have
bought the exact real estate where Planned Parenthoods were located after
aggressive TRAP laws forced the Planned Parenthood clinics to close their
doors.36 However, unlike the Planned Parenthood clinics, which are licensed and

30. Jenny Kutner, How Crisis Pregnancy Centers are Using Taxpayer Dollars to Lie to Women,
SALON (July 14, 2015),
https://www.salon.com/2015/07/14/how_crisis_pregnancy_centers_are_using_taxpayer_dollars_to_lie_t
o_women/ [https://perma.cc/6ZQD-4X7A] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). This number is difficult to
confirm, given that many CPCs operate without a license. The number of CPCs is likely even higher in
many states.
31. Teddy Wilson, ‘Completely Intentional’: Fake Clinics Outnumber Abortion Providers 10 to 1
in Texas, REWIRE.NEWS (May 24, 2018), https://rewire.news/article/2018/05/24/completely-intentionalfake-clinics-outnumber-abortion-providers-10-1-texas/ [https://perma.cc/J3EG-2W9B] (last visited Nov.
19, 2018).
32. See MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV. REFORM, FALSE AND MISLEADING HEALTH
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FEDERALLY FUNDED PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS 6 (July 2006)
(prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman). At the Congressman’s request, the Special Investigations
Division evaluated twenty-three CPCs through anonymous telephone interviews and also reviewed
website tactics and advertising methods.
33. Unmasking Fake Clinics: An Investigation into California’s Crisis Pregnancy Centers,
NARAL PRO-CHOICE CALIFORNIA FOUND., www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/download-files/cpcreport-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/G578-KQN8] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
34. “If you don’t hook her right away, she hangs up on you. When she calls and she says ‘Do you
do abortions?’ I say ‘Are you calling for yourself or are you calling for your friend?’...and we engage in
conversation. Because if she calls and says ‘Do you do abortions?’ and I say ‘No,’ click. [The CPC
director pantomimes hanging up the phone]. I’m trying to get her in the door. Take control of the
conversation . . . I don’t mind the criticisms of taking control. ‘That doesn’t sound fair.’ Well too bad!”
12TH & DELAWARE (Home Box Office 2010). See also JACKSON (Girl Friday Films 2016).
35. In another scene from 12th and Delaware, a CPC director conducts a training for volunteers in
which she emphasizes the value of proximity to a clinic that provides abortions. She tells volunteers:
“Clearly our competition is the abortion clinic. We are actually on opposite sides of the street . . . .
They’re not always sure who they’re calling anyway.” 12TH & DELAWARE (Home Box Office 2010). See
also Holtzman, supra note 9, at 86.
36. These laws impose stringent requirements on abortion clinics that dictate such things as the
width of hallways, lighting requirements, square footage requirements for exam space, admitting
privileges for physicians at area hospitals, etc. Many clinics have had to close in the wake of these laws,
which was the intended effect. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Borrowing from Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine in Analyzing Abortion Clinic Regulations, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 41, 45 (2016); see also Rachel
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thoroughly regulated as medical clinics, CPCs are often not so licensed.
Recognizing that many states could close the CPCs under statutes that require
health facilities and their staff to be licensed, NIFLA has assisted over 700 CPCs
in their conversion into licensed medical clinics.37 These conversions are a step
in the right direction, as additional safeguards come from the CPCs being
licensed. However, licensure has not completely halted the deceptive practices
of CPCs. And, while many of the women who obtain services from CPCs assume
they are getting treated by health care professionals who are subject to all that
comes with that perception, the CPCs that remain unlicensed are not subjected
to the numerous health, safety, and privacy regulations that attend to the regular
practice of medicine.38 There is a great mismatch between the way CPCs present
themselves to the public and the way they have presented themselves to the
courts.
This Article will proceed in four parts. The first section will discuss how
legislators have attempted to thwart deceptive CPC practices through mandatory
disclosure laws, and how these statutes have been successfully challenged on
First Amendment grounds. While state consumer protection statutes provide
fantastic avenues for correcting CPCs’ deception, they have been bafflingly
underutilized due to political pressure in conservative states. Local prosecutors
are not motivated to bring these consumer protection lawsuits against CPCs.
Therefore, the second section makes the primary argument for a private remedy
in tort law. Rather than rely on under-enforced or constitutionally vulnerable
consumer protection regulation, this Article advocates for the use of the private,
intentional tort of battery to provide redress for the women who have been
physically touched by the CPCs’ and injured by their deceptive practices. There
are many advantages to this approach, which puts many injured women in the
driver’s seat, offers them money damages, and does not require legislative or
political cooperation. In sections three and four, this Article discusses how states
could, but do not, prosecute CPCs for the unlawful practice of medicine without
a license, or for the use of FDA-approved devices in unapproved ways. Again,
due to the lack of political will to enforce these options, they are not likely to
provide an adequate remedy to most American women. The Article then
concludes with some forward-looking concerns about the ways that medical
informed consent has been hijacked by the pro-life movement. Contrasting how
the First Amendment protects CPCs’ deceptive speech but is quite limited in its
protection of the free speech rights of licensed medical providers, the Article

Suppé, A Right in Theory but Not in Practice: Voter Discrimination and Trap Laws As Barriers to
Exercising A Constitutional Right, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 130 (2014). Following
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), many of these TRAP laws might be
struck down, but much damage in terms of patient access has already been done.
37. Chen, supra note 5, at 935–36.
38. In order to avoid state fines for the unauthorized practice of medicine, some CPCs have begun
requiring that their nurses and medical directors maintain active medical licenses.
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explores some concepts rooted in medical ethics. Namely, this Article
acknowledges and articulates a worrying trend in reproductive jurisprudence
which blurs the medical with the ideological, shoehorning politics through the
mouths of licensed medical providers and doing violence to the physician-patient
relationship.
I.

REGULATING CPCS THROUGH LEGISLATIVELY-COMPELLED DISCLOSURES

A. Legislators Pass Disclosure Requirements to Curb the Documented,
Deceptive Practices of CPCs
City and county legislators were understandably upset when the Waxman
Report and other local investigations revealed the extent to which pregnant
women were being misled by CPCs.39 Many cities and counties have passed
ordinances attempting to curb the deception of CPCs through mandatory
disclosure requirements.40 Typically, these ordinances required notices to be
placed in the CPC waiting rooms indicating that the clinic is not licensed, or
(more constitutionally infirm) stating that the CPC does not refer anyone to
abortion services.41 These types of disclosure requirements have been struck
down by the Fourth Circuit and, most recently, by the Supreme Court, for
requiring speech that is not narrowly tailored or necessary to fulfill a compelling

39. Investigations in California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, North Carolina,
Texas, and Virginia all have documented CPCs’ intentionally misleading practices. NARAL PROCHOICE CAL. FOUND., UNMASKING FAKE CLINICS: THE TRUTH ABOUT CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN
CALIFORNIA (2010), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Unmasking-FakeClinics-The-Truth-About-Crisis-Pregnancy-Centers-in-California-.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ2X-PNHQ]
(last visited Dec. 25, 2018); NARAL PRO-CHOICE MD. FUND, MARYLAND CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER
INVESTIGATIONS: THE TRUTH REVEALED (2008), https://maryland.prochoiceamericaaffiliates.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/11/2018/04/crisispregnancycenterreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/86M9-WRKX] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2018); NARAL PRO-CHOICE MASS. & PRO-CHOICE MASS. FOUND., JUST BECAUSE
YOU’RE PREGNANT . . . LIES, HALF TRUTHS, AND MANIPULATION AT CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN
MASSACHUSETTS (2011); NARAL PRO-CHOICE N.Y. FOUND. & NAT’L INST. FOR REPROD. HEALTH,
“SHE SAID ABORTION COULD CAUSE BREAST CANCER”: A REPORT ON THE LIES, MANIPULATIONS, AND
PRIVACY VIOLATIONS OF CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS IN NEW YORK CITY (2010),
https://www.nirhealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/cpcreport2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RMJ5TTN] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018); NARAL PRO-CHOICE N.C. FOUND., THE TRUTH REVEALED:
NORTH CAROLINA’S CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS (2011), http://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/10/2011NARAL_CPCReport_V05_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/RCD6-Z96F] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2018); NARAL PRO-CHOICE TEX. FOUND., THE TEXAS “ALTERNATIVES TO
ABORTION” PROGRAM: BAD HEALTH POLICY, BAD FISCAL POLICY (2011),
http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=163224 [https://perma.cc/3QS8-D8EY] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2018): NARAL PRO-CHOICE VA., CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS REVEALED, PART II:
AN INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE ON VIRGINIA CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS (2013); Press Release, NARAL
Pro-Choice Mo. Found., Show Me Truth: NARAL Pro-Choice Missouri Organizes a Community Protest
Against Deceptive Health Practices at ThriVe St. Louis (Feb. 11, 2012) (on file with author).
40. Brittany A. Campbell, The Crisis Inside Crisis Pregnancy Centers: How to Stop These
Facilities from Depriving Women of Their Reproductive Freedom, 37 B.C.J.L. & SOC. JUST. 73, 84
(2017).
41. Id.
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state interest.42 Given how much the recent Supreme Court opinion, NIFLA v.
Becerra, limits future restrictions on CPCs’ speech, it will be discussed in some
detail below.
B. CPCs Challenge Disclosures as Violations of Free Speech
The First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits the enactment of laws “abridging the freedom of
speech.”43 Consequently, government has “no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”44 Laws that
require speakers to communicate a particular message (“content-based” laws)
“are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government
proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”45
However, the Court has held that this does not apply when the government seeks
to regulate the commercial or professional speech of participants in the public
marketplace.46 In the past, the Supreme Court “has been wary of claims that
regulation of business activity, particularly health-related activity, violates the
Constitution.”47 The key question for regulating CPCs under the First
Amendment, therefore, is whether the CPC’s speech is ideological, commercial,
or professional.
An ordinance passed by Baltimore’s city council required CPCs to disclose
that “the center does not provide or make referral for abortion or birth-control
services,” and the disclosure must be “written in English and Spanish,” “easily
readable,” and “conspicuously posted in the center’s waiting room or other area
where individuals await service.”48 This was thus a content-based regulation, and
if the speaker were ideological, as opposed to commercial or professional, the
ordinance would need to satisfy strict scrutiny. A Baltimore CPC and the
Catholic archbishop of Baltimore challenged this disclosure requirement as
violating their free speech. A federal court in Maryland enjoined enforcement of
the ordinance after the Fourth Circuit remanded, demanding greater discovery.49

42. Holtzman, supra note 9, at 79.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
45. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
46. More will be said infra, at Section I.B.3 about the application of the Zauderer precedent to
CPCs speech. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
650–53 (1985).
47. See Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2381 (2018) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
48. Greater Baltimore Ctr. For Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
721 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2013).
49. The district court’s hasty decision cannot be excused by its ruling that any commercial speech
regulated by the Ordinance ‘is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech,’ thus
triggering strict scrutiny. Id. at 287.
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Baltimore County appealed this decision, but the appellate court has not yet ruled
on the matter.
In Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, a CPC challenged the Maryland
county’s requirement that CPCs warn women that “the Center does not have a
licensed medical professional on staff” and “the Montgomery County Health
Officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed
health care provider.”50 Despite acknowledging that “context matters” and courts
must look to “the effect of the compelled statement [on the listener],”51 the
district court emphasized that the speech that was being regulated occurred not
on websites or through advertising, but in the CPC’s waiting room, and “within
Centro Tepeyac’s four walls, much closer to their ideological message.”52 They
then struck down the ordinances as violating the CPC’s free speech rights. The
Fourth Circuit found that, as content-based compelled speech, the county
ordinance failed to pass strict scrutiny.53
California’s Reproductive FACT Act (“the FACT Act”)54 fared better in the
lower federal courts, in part because it technically applied to all non-profit
community clinics offering pregnancy counseling offices, rather than just those
that are unlicensed or pro-life.55 In addition, the statute did not include any
language about the state’s preference regarding where women received their
pregnancy care, or that they were encouraged to see a licensed provider.56 The
stated aims were clearer as well: to make sure California women were apprised
of state-funded reproductive services in a timely fashion, and were made aware
of how to access them.57 The legislative findings acknowledged that “pregnancy
50. 5 F. Supp. 3d 745, 748 (D. Md. 2014).
51. Id. at 758.
52. Id. at 760.
53. 683 F.3d 591, 594 (4th Cir. 2012), on reh’g en banc sub nom. Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery
Cty., 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013).
54. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123470-123473 (Deering 2018).
55. The Act did have exemptions for certain facilities, which may have proved fatal to the Act. The
first exemption was for clinics operated by a federal agency, and was included so the Act was not
federally pre-empted. The second exemption was for clinics that participated in California’s “Family
Planning, Access, Care, and Treatment Program” (Family PACT program). Id. § 123471(c). To
participate in the Family PACT program, a clinic must provide “the full scope of family planning . . .
services specified for the program,” CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 24005 (Deering 2018), including
sterilization and emergency contraceptive pills, Id. § 24007.
56. It does seem odd, however, that the state interest in protecting women’s health would not allow
states to encourage women to see a licensed medical provider for their pregnancy care. Pregnancy is a
medical condition, with significant risk of complication and even death. It seems like an entirely
legitimate use of the states’ public health police power to encourage women to be seen by someone who
was professionally trained and licensed.
57. “The legislature was concerned with women who may not be aware that certain health options
are available to them, and wanted to ensure women in California are informed of the full range of free
and low-cost services available to them when they make their reproductive decisions. In this way, the
Act more closely resembles informed consent cases than deceptive advertising cases.” See A Woman’s
Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1209 (E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 669 F.
App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. See also Cal. Health & Safety Code
§ 123470 (West 2016). See also Public Health—Women—Reproductive Fact Act, 2015 Cal. Legis.
Serv. Ch. 700 (A.B. 775) (West 2015).
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decisions are time sensitive,” and so the state must supplement their public health
education with materials placed in the clinic offices.58
1. NIFLA v. Becerra in the Ninth Circuit
The Act contained two critical parts. The first part required any pregnancy
counseling center that was not licensed as a medical facility to conspicuously
place a notice in the entrance of the facility, at least 8.5 inches by 11 inches in
size and written in no less than 48-point type font, that stated that the facility
“was not licensed as a medical facility and had no licensed medical provider.”
They were also required to post this statement on billboards and any advertising
materials for the CPC.59 Failure to comply resulted in a $500 fine for the first
offense, and $1000 fines thereafter.60 This part of the Act will be referred to
hereinafter as the “unlicensed disclosure” provision.
The second part of the Act required licensed facilities to disclose that
California has free or low-cost state-funded family planning options.
Specifically, covered clinics must post in their waiting rooms, in printed
materials, or digitally at check-in that “California has public programs that
provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning
services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care,
and abortion for eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, contact the
county social services office at [insert the telephone number].”61 The stated
reason for the Act was California’s desire that women have immediate access to
California’s “comprehensive family planning services and pregnancy-related
care through the Medi-Cal and the Family PACT programs.”62 This part of the
Act will be referred to as the “licensed disclosure” provision.
A handful of California CPCs petitioned for an injunction, to prevent the
state of California from enforcing either part of the statute. They claimed that

58. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1208 (E.D. Cal.
2015), aff’d, 669 F. App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. See also
Sections 1, 2 and 4 of California Stats.2015, c. 700 (A.B.775), which provide in part, “(a) All California
women, regardless of income, should have access to reproductive health services . . . “(c) Because
pregnancy decisions are time sensitive, and care early in pregnancy is important, California must
supplement its own efforts to advise women of its reproductive health programs. In California, lowincome women can receive immediate access to free or low-cost comprehensive family planning
services and pregnancy-related care through the Medi-Cal and the Family PACT programs. However,
only Medi-Cal providers who are enrolled in the Family PACT program are authorized to enroll patients
immediately at their health centers.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123470 (West YEAR).
59. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(b)(1) (Deering 2018).
60. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123473 (West YEAR).
61. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(2).
62. “Because pregnancy decisions are time sensitive, and care early in pregnancy is important,
California must supplement its own efforts to advise women of its reproductive health programs. In
California, low-income women can receive immediate access to free or low-cost comprehensive family
planning services and pregnancy-related care through the Medi-Cal and the Family PACT programs.”
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123470 (West 2018).
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both provisions violated their rights to free speech under the U.S. Constitution.
The district courts and Ninth Circuit denied the injunctions.63
Given the state’s consumer and health protection reasons for passing the law,
the Ninth Circuit held that the unlicensed disclosure survived strict scrutiny and
was viewpoint neutral.64 As for the licensed disclosure, the Ninth Circuit agreed
that this provision regulated professional speech, and thus was subject to (and
survived) intermediate scrutiny. As the Ninth Circuit was only applying
intermediate scrutiny to this part of the Act, it held that the compelled speech
need not be the least restrictive means necessary, and “[the notice] does not
contain any more speech than necessary, nor does it encourage, suggest, or imply
that women should use those state-funded services. The Licensed Notice is
closely drawn to achieve California’s interests . . . .”65 According to the Court of
Appeals, the petitioners could not demonstrate likely success on the merits of
their First Amendment free speech claims for either part of the Act, so the
injunction was denied.66
The CPCs petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and in 2017, certiorari
was granted in NIFLA v. Becerra.67 The Court certified the question of whether
the Act’s compelled speech requirements violate CPCs’ right to free speech
under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The case would resolve the
conflict between the Fourth and Ninth Circuits as to how to classify the relevant
speech and the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. Oral arguments were heard
in the spring of 2018, and the opinion was issued in June of 2018.
2. The Supreme Court Protects CPCs’ Right to Deceive by Holding that
they are Not Medical Providers
The Supreme Court had a different interpretation of both the applicable
precedent and the statute itself. The majority granted the CPCs’ injunction,

63. Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016) rev’d and
remanded sub nom., Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
64. A few district courts found the licensed disclosure to be a regulation of professional, not
ideological speech, and therefore subject to heightened, but not strict, constitutional review. See
Mountain Right to Life, Inc. v. Becerra, 692 F. App’x 807, 808 (9th Cir. 2017); Livingwell Med. Clinic,
Inc. v. Harris, 669 F. App’x 493, 493-95 (9th Cir. 2016); A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v.
Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v.
Harris, 669 F. App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016). See also Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184,
189 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The court observed that content-based speech regulations ordinarily are subject to
strict scrutiny, but that lesser degrees of scrutiny may apply where the speech at issue is, inter alia,
commercial or professional.”).
65. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 839 F.3d at 842.
66. “California has a substantial interest in the health of its citizens, including ensuring that its
citizens have access to and adequate information about constitutionally-protected medical services like
abortion. The California Legislature determined that a substantial number of California citizens may not
be aware of, or have access to, medical services relevant to pregnancy.” Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life
Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 841 (9th Cir. 2016).
67. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 464 (2017).
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prohibiting enforcement of the Act.68 Justice Thomas wrote for the majority,
finding that both parts of the Act “likely violated” the CPCs’ right to free
speech.69 The Court achieved this result by making a series of creative but
disingenuous moves. Each of these moves rested on the factually inaccurate and
easily disprovable assumption that the CPCs are not practicing medicine or
providing medical services.
The cornerstone of petitioner’s argument was that CPCs were not medical
providers and what they do is not considered a medical intervention. There is a
mismatch, then, between how CPCs present themselves before the Supreme
Court, and how they are presenting themselves to the public. It was this mismatch
that the state of California sought to rectify with its Act, by requiring CPCs to
disclose their true unlicensed nature. And, given that the case was resolved at the
preliminary injunction phase, without much fact-finding, it is this very mismatch
that the CPCs successfully exploited before the Supreme Court to deem their
speech more protected than that of a licensed physician.
Consider this telling exchange between NIFLA’s attorney, Michael Farris,
and Justice Ginsburg. Justice Ginsburg was evidently trying to understand why
the state of California could not compel a CPC to offer accurate and nonmisleading medical information to pregnant women, something constitutionally
permissible under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.70
Justice Ginsburg: “But why isn’t this also informed consent? . . . So—
so that the patient will know what are the array of services available to
her?”
Michael Farris: “Your Honor, the services provided by our licensed
centers are not medical interventions.”71
Petitioner’s attorney conceded that if the state of California considered CPCs
to be practicing medicine, they could prosecute them for the unauthorized
practice of medicine.72 However, NIFLA’s attorney also stated that they do not
think they are practicing medicine or providing medical interventions, despite
their stated compliance with HIPAA requirements that only apply to medical
covered entities, or their provision of pregnancy tests, counseling, exams, or
ultrasounds, any of which would constitute the practice of medicine in any

68. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
69. Id. at 2380.
70. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
71. Oral Argument at 01:51, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
72. Oral Argument at 17:39, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
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state.73 To reiterate, what the CPCs advertise themselves as providing, and what
they actually provide, should be considered medical services, interventions, and
the practice of medicine in every single U.S. state. The CPCs’ definition of “the
practice of medicine” finds no support under any existing state law.
a.

Is the CPC speaking as a commercial, ideological, or medical
entity?

The classification of the speech is central for First Amendment analyses.
This is a particularly difficult task in the present case, as CPCs demonstrate
aspects of all three types of speech: commercial, professional, and ideological.
It is therefore no surprise that there was a conflict between the district courts
about how to classify the speech of CPCs. While the distinctions between each
type are not as clear as they once were, federal precedent has mostly assumed
that these categories were mutually exclusive.
If the CPCs were engaged in purely commercial speech, the statutes in
question would traditionally be subject to mere rational basis review.74 Under
rational basis, the state need only offer a plausible basis for the legislation that is
minimally connected to the Act. In effect, this means the CPCs would not be
given First Amendment protection when they are misleading consumers or when
the compelled speech serves to ensure the provision of accurate information.75
The main objective in the analysis of compelled commercial speech is “the
protection of the consumer’s interest in the free flow of truthful commercial
information.”76
The Supreme Court has recently complicated these traditional distinctions a
bit, however, offering greater protection to some forms of commercial speech.
In Sorrell v. IMS, the Court applied “heightened” scrutiny to a Vermont
consumer protection statute that prohibited data-miners and pharmaceutical
manufacturers from selling or using a doctor’s prescribing information.77
Understanding the information disclosure objective of commercial speech
regulation helps to explain Sorrell, where the Court found that restrictions on
commercial speech (rather than the more typical compelled speech) violated the
First Amendment.78 In this same case, Justice Breyer reminded the majority that
the courts should exercise caution before applying heightened scrutiny

73. Oral Argument at 19:51, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ]. More
will be said about the unlawful practice of medicine, and the state’s ability to prosecute CPCs under this
authority. See discussion infra Section IV.
74. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1199 (E.D. Cal.
2015), aff’d, 669 F. App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016).
75. The Central Hudson test informs the proper regulation of commercial speech.
76. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 426 (2001).
77. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
78. Id. at 564.
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“whenever such a program burdens speech” as this would frustrate separation of
powers and “distort or undermine legitimate legislative objectives.”79 Even
though Sorrell was about restricting rather than compelling speech, this case can
be read as signaling an erosion of the typical deference afforded to state
consumer-protection statutes.
In the case of California’s FACT Act, federal courts applied the traditional
framework for commercial speech. In First Resort v. Herrera, the Ninth Circuit
held that whether speech is commercial “does not hinge solely on whether the
[CPCs have] an economic motive.”80 Under this view, even speech that is
provided by volunteers can be classified as commercial as it is spoken in a
“marketplace” for reproductive services. And if it is commercial, the Act would
be a permissible regulation on the dissemination of false or misleading
statements.81
Professional speech, on the other hand, has traditionally been afforded
intermediate review. This was justified because professionals, “through their
education and training, have access to a corpus of specialized knowledge that
their clients usually do not” and that clients put “their health or their livelihood
in the hands of those who utilize knowledge and methods with which [they]
ordinarily have little or no familiarity.”82 Intermediate review meant that the
regulation need not be the least restrictive necessary to further a compelling state
interest. As the Act applied both to licensed and unlicensed facilities, there was
at least some argument that the speech is not professional, particularly when it is
compelled by CPCs that have no professional or licensed staff.83 But given that
the CPCs presented themselves as medical providers, and did offer some
professional services such as diagnosing pregnancies and offering ultrasounds,
there was also an argument that they were engaged in professional speech. The
Ninth Circuit adopted this latter argument, finding the CPCs to be engaged in
professional speech.84
The Fourth Circuit disagreed even further and found CPCs’ speech to be
ideological due to their pro-life agenda.85 This interpretation was bolstered by
the fact that the CPCs offered free services and products. Ideological speech is
afforded the greatest First Amendment protection. It is assumed that the state’s
79. Id. at 584-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80. First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 2017).
81. Id. at 1273-74.
82. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
83. Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of
Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 772-73 (1999).
84. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839 (9th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted in part sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 464, 199 L. Ed.
2d 328 (2017), and rev’d and remanded sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra,
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
85. Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264, 285 (4th Cir.
2013).
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purpose in compelling this speech is the most suspicious. Given this, restrictions
on ideological speech are subjected to strict scrutiny, and absent compelling state
interests, and a statutory scope that is narrowly tailored to address those state
interests, the restriction will fail.
The problem, of course, and the reason for the disparate treatment among
federal courts, is that CPCs exhibit aspects of commercial, professional, and
ideological speech. To the outside layperson, they appear to be a medical clinic,
but to the sophisticated courts and attorneys, who have access to much more
information about the mission and funding of CPCs, they are obviously
ideological. And while they usually do not charge for their services, they are still
at least partially commercial in that they are competing with licensed medical
providers in the marketplace to offer a reproductive service.
b. The Supreme Court Classifies CPC Speech as Ideological
While the classification was far from obvious, then, the Supreme Court
decided to treat CPCs’ speech as ideological. It did so by largely ignoring the
way CPCs hold themselves out to the public and ignoring that much of what they
do is a professional service. It also distinguished between speech and conduct,
holding that precedent allowing greater regulation of professionals was targeted
at professional speech that is incident to a professional service. This proved
pivotal, as it allowed the Court to distinguish precedents upholding TRAP laws
and other compelled disclosures in the marketplace of licensed physicians.
3. The Unlicensed Disclosure Provision
Given that CPCs advertise to the public for services, the unlicensed
disclosure provision should have been uncontroversial. States have long
recognized an interest in promoting consumer protection and regulating
commerce to promote public health and safety. More specifically, the Supreme
Court has also recognized the importance of ensuring that consumers know
whether they are visiting a licensed medical provider.86 The state’s interest has
been considered stronger than the individual practitioner’s freedoms.87
Even if CPCs were not considered medical providers, regulations on
professional speech have often been upheld to protect consumers. The Court has
recognized that professionals can be required to provide “purely factual and
uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . services will be
available.”88 In Zauderer, the Court upheld a requirement that attorneys disclose

86. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
87. Id.
88. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650-53
(1985).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3345301

20

Yale Journal of Law and Feminism

[Vol. 30:1

their contingency-fee payment structure to potential clients. The Court reasoned
that the
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual
information in his advertising is minimal . . . [and] warning[s] or
disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate the
possibility of consumer confusion or deception.89
In NIFLA, the majority stated that the Zauderer precedent did not apply
because Zauderer applied only to purely factual information. Here, the Court
stated that “information about state-sponsored services—including abortion,
[are] hardly an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”90 But this is where they reveal their
category error and confuse the speaker (ideological, controversial pro-life group)
with the speech (which is purely factual and should not itself be considered
controversial).91 The Court then claimed that even if Zauderer did apply,
however, the Act still failed, as the disclosures were “unjustified or unduly
burdensome,”92 especially as applied to a CPC’s advertising materials.93 They
did so by focusing on the cost of compliance to CPCs.
Even though the majority classified the speech as ideological and unduly
burdensome, it did not stop there. It decided to go further, and rejected the
distinction between professional and non-professional speech, questioning
lower-court analyses to the extent they applied an intermediate level of scrutiny.
The Court reasoned that professional speech is “a difficult category to define
with precision.”94 By imposing a licensure requirement, this “gives the States
unfettered power to reduce a group’s First Amendment rights.”95
Perhaps the most puzzling part of the majority’s opinion was the
asymmetrical finding by the Court that the harm to pregnant women from CPCs’
deception was imaginary, and the harm to the CPCs by enforcing the Act was
very real. In finding that the licensed disclosure provision was perhaps
responding to a “purely hypothetical harm,”96 the Court ignored the briefing by
the state and its legislative findings in passing the Act, which documented the
extent to which women were being misled by CPCs. The legislature had provided
ample evidence of harm, which the Court ignored.97

89. Id. at 651.
90. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2367 (2018).
91. Previously, the Court had acknowledged that different types of content might be treated
differently, even if still content-based and all subjected to strict scrutiny.
92. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
93. Id. at 2373-76.
94. Id. at 2375.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2377.
97. In finding that the harm here may be “purely hypothetical,” and the disclosure unnecessary, the
Court seems to be considering the availability of other state options for curbing deceptive practices, such
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In contrast, the harm to the CPCs from having to comply with the Act was
considered by the Court to be “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”98 The Court
then reasoned that “[e]ven if the State had presented a nonhypothetical
justification, the FACT Act unduly burdens protected speech,” as “[i]t imposes
a government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement” that applies
regardless of whether the CPCs disclose their non-licensed status on their
website.99 Of course, this assumes that everyone has access to these
advertisements before entering the CPC.
4. The Majority Places Much Consumer Protection Law at Constitutional
Risk
By describing the disclosure in this way, the Court cast too wide of a net,
rendering many consumer protection statutes unconstitutional. As Breyer’s
dissent correctly points out, this aspect of NIFLA has the potential for sweeping
impact outside of the abortion context, as “virtually every disclosure law could
be considered ‘content based,’ for virtually every disclosure law requires
individuals to speak a particular message.”100
The majority responds that “[c]ontrary to the suggestion in the dissent, we
do not question the legality of health and safety warnings long considered
permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about commercial
products.”101 But if the FACT Act is not considered a regulation to protect health
and safety, it is hard to imagine what would be. The majority’s opinion offers no
guidance on this score. Why is the Act not directed at protecting public health?
The Court’s confusing reasoning could invalidate many state regulations, of
such things as cigarettes, securities, guns, or environmental pollutants, on First
Amendment grounds. States typically do not require non-polluters to state that

as the ability of the state to prosecute for the unlawful practice of medicine or under general state
consumer protection laws. However, the bill specified the harm the Reproductive FACT Act was meant
to address, namely that “In 2012, more than 2.6 million California women were in need of publicly
funded family planning services. More than 700,000 California women become pregnant every year and
one-half of these pregnancies are unintended. In 2010, 64.3 percent of unplanned births in California
were publicly funded. Yet, at the moment they learn that they are pregnant, thousands of women remain
unaware of the public programs available to provide them with contraception, health education and
counseling, family planning, prenatal care, abortion, or delivery. Because pregnancy decisions are time
sensitive, and care early in pregnancy is important, California must supplement its own efforts to advise
women of its reproductive health programs. In California, low-income women can receive immediate
access to free or low-cost comprehensive family planning services and pregnancy-related care through
the Medi–Cal and the Family PACT programs.” See PUBLIC HEALTH—WOMEN—
REPRODUCTIVE FACT ACT, 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 700 (A.B. 775) (WEST).
98. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
99. Id. at 2377.
100. Id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting). “[M]uch, perhaps most, human behavior takes place
through speech and because much, perhaps most, law regulates that speech in terms of its content, the
majority’s approach at the least threatens considerable litigation over the constitutional validity of much,
perhaps most, government regulation.” Id.
101. Id. at 2376.
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they are non-polluting, or that non-cigarettes do not contain nicotine. If passing
legislation that targets the deceivers is considered impermissible “governmentscripted” content discrimination, then much regulation of controversial products
or industries would be unconstitutional. And the majority’s general disclaimer
that this is not what they meant “seem[s] more likely to invite litigation than to
provide needed limitation and clarification.”102
This holding is quite disturbing and far-reaching. CPCs create deceptive
advertising, and then cannot be required to correct it. Imagine if a gun
manufacturer misled consumers to believe that a gun could do things that it could
not do, or was safer than it was. Then, imagine the state passing a law requiring
the manufacturer to correct this deception. Under the Supreme Court’s opinion
in NIFLA, the statute could be presumptively unconstitutional, as the subject
matter is controversial (guns) and the disclosure might cost the gun
manufacturers money. This would, of course, ignore the fact that it was the
actions of the gun manufacturers that created the deception in the first place. This
paradoxical outcome should be alarming to anyone concerned about deceptive
advertising.
5. The Licensed Disclosure Provision
The Supreme Court also found that the second part of the Act likely violated
the CPCs’ right to free speech. As with the unlicensed disclosure, the bulk of the
constitutional work was done when it classified the CPCs’ speech as ideological
rather than professional. Recall that in Zauderer, professional speech could be
regulated for consumer protection.103
a.

To Distinguish Casey, CPCs Deemed To Not Be Providing
Medical Services, and the Licensed Disclosure was Not Informed
Consent

The Court made it clear that the licensed disclosure is not “an informed
consent requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct.”104 This is
because it is not tied to the provision of a “medical procedure,” and applies to all
interactions between a CPC and a pregnant woman.105 Of course, this is a very
narrow reading of informed consent doctrine, as licensed doctors can be and have
been required to provide information to women that is disconnected from a
medical procedure. For example, when physicians provide information about the
likely side effects of medications, something they are legally required to do, this
102.
103.
(1985).
104.
105.

Id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626, 651
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2373.
Id.
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disclosure would not be part of medical informed consent under the NIFLA
framework. Likewise, outside of the health care context, employers can be
required to post safety notices in their break-rooms that do not directly apply to
their employee’s immediate conduct, and restaurants that serve alcohol can be
required to post notices about the risks of drinking alcohol, regardless of whether
a patron orders any alcoholic beverages. Never before have health disclosures
needed to be immediately tied to the speaker’s conduct to pass First Amendment
scrutiny.
The requirement that the health and safety disclosure be limited to those
instances where a “medical procedure” is immediately to be performed also
reflects a very narrow, and incorrect, reading of what it means to practice
medicine. Under this definition, pediatricians, geriatricians, general
practitioners, infectious disease doctors, and many other specialties rarely
practice medicine. These are considered “cognitive” specialties where
procedures are not typically performed, and instead health care is discussed and
monitored, and referrals are made. These physicians would almost certainly
dispute the idea that medical services are only rendered, and informed consent is
only required, when a procedure is about to be performed. To say that only
“procedures” amount to medical services is bizarre and incorrect. It is also
dismissive of the large majority of health care providers, who never perform, or
bill for, any procedures, and yet who are still legally required to maintain a
license to practice medicine. Further, if a CPC provides medical services at any
point, which they do when diagnosing a pregnancy, conducting physical exams,
or performing ultrasounds, it should be deemed a medical clinic. There is no such
thing as a part-time or fractional medical clinic. After all, just because a
physician fills out forms for patients who want to play sports or paperwork for
insurance billing, these non-procedure activities do not render the clinic a nonclinic. It is completely at odds with the concept of the “practice of medicine” to
think of a medical clinic as only providing medical services when a physician is
cutting open a patient.
Of course, there was more to this rhetorical move than merely dodging
Zauderer. It was critical to find that CPCs were not practicing medicine in order
to distinguish the informed consent precedent specific to abortion. Casey made
it quite clear that the state could require providers to offer non-misleading and
accurate information as part of informed consent to abortion, and that this
requirement would not violate due process or free speech.106 But because the
Supreme Court did not view the CPCs as medical providers, they did not apply
Casey. The FACT Act disclosures, they reasoned, could be made in the lobby of
the pseudo-clinic, before any medical procedures were technically provided.
There was no medical procedure being performed yet, and because the CPCs are

106. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
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not medical providers, there may never be any medical service provided.
Apparently, to the NIFLA majority, informed consent is only triggered moments
before an abortion procedure is about to be performed—and not as part of general
reproductive counseling.107 In oral argument, Justice Sotomayor recognized the
problem with this, asking “how’s [what a CPC does] different from what a doctor
does? When you go in for a pregnancy, you see the doctor, and the doctor will
describe, hopefully, the benefits of a pregnancy and perhaps its risk because,
depending—not all pregnancies are without complications. So this is consulting
about a medical condition. How is that any different than Casey? You come in
to talk to an—a doctor about abortion.”108 NIFLA’s attorney responded that this
was different because Casey applied to doctors, and NIFLA is not a medical
provider. Justice Sotomayor responded, “now you’re redefining medicine.”109
Indeed.
If the Court had focused on the reasonable perspective of the listener, and
analogized the CPCs to medical providers, it would have been fairly simple for
the Court to allow the disclosures as part of the proper regulation of medicine
and/or professional speech. It is patently unjust to allow CPCs to deceive women,
and then not allow states to correct this deception through disclosure
requirements that target the deception where it occurs.
With Zauderer and Casey out of the way, the Court still needed to
demonstrate that the regulation was not narrowly tailored. Here, the Court missed
a step by suggesting (but not finding) that the Act discriminated based on
viewpoint and interpreting any evidentiary ambiguity in favor of NIFLA. While
“the Government bears the burden of proof on the ultimate question [of the
statute’s] constitutionality,”110 the Court was overly dismissive of California’s
evidence regarding the need for tailoring its statute in the way that it did. Namely,
the Court dismissed the evidence that a public outreach campaign would be
ineffective and would leave many women vulnerable to the CPC’s deceptive
practices.111

107. This is surprising, as courts have held that providing women counseling and prenatal vitamins
constitutes the practice of medicine, to which regular tort law informed consent would attach.
108. Oral Argument at 14:55, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
109. Id. at 17:00.
110. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004).
111. “The record also shows the licensed facilities notice requirement is appropriately tailored to
advance the interest of ensuring that pregnant women are informed about their health care options.
Indeed, the requirement is narrowly tailored. As the Legislature recognized, pregnancy decisions are
time sensitive and care early in pregnancy is critical. Thus, women need to be notified of available
resources as soon as possible. See Assem. Bill No. 775, § 1(a)-(d). The time-sensitive nature of
pregnancy makes other policy options—such as a statewide advertising campaign, for example—
unavailable to the Legislature. As the author of AB 775 stated, the most effective way to make sure that
pregnant women obtain the information and services they need during pregnancy in a timely way is to
require a licensed health care facility to provide the required notice, especially if the facility does not
provide the full spectrum of health care services.” Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
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NIFLA argued that the Act discriminated based on viewpoint because it
exempted facilities that enroll patients in state-funded reproductive programs,
which include abortion. By exempting these clinics, they argued, “the statute
unnecessarily imposes a disproportionate burden upon facilities with pro-life
views, the very facilities most likely to find the statute’s references to abortion
morally abhorrent.”112 But, as Breyer points out in his dissent, the evidentiary
record was insufficient on this score. The district court found that the exemption
made sense because the exempted clinics “provide the entire spectrum of
services required of the notice.”113 Absent discovery, there was no evidence that
the Act disproportionately and unfairly impacted CPCs. True, poor pregnant
women might visit exempt clinics, and they might benefit from the disclosure
that the state offers low-cost or free reproductive options. But there was nothing
in the record to suggest that the exempt clinics were not already providing this
information, as respondents claimed.114
The Court reasoned that if the state interest was in informing women that
state-funded public health options were available, California should have
required all clinics to disclose this availability, and not just those that fail to offer
the relevant services. In oral argument, the state’s attorney attempted to argue
that it limited the compelled speech to only those speakers necessitating the
disclosure. The Act could have been deemed over-inclusive if it had required
clinics providing abortion and contraception to advertise the availability of statefunding for the same, without any evidence that this disclosure was necessary.
Indeed, in discussing the unlicensed disclosure, the NIFLA Court recognized that
“disclosures [must] remedy a harm that is ‘potentially real not purely
hypothetical’ and the remedy must extend “no broader than reasonably

Preliminary Injunction at 32, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Kamala Harris, 2015 WL
13649183 (S.D. Cal.).
112. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2388-89 (2018) (citing
Brief for Petitioners 31-37).
113. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, No. 15CV2277 JAH(DHB), 2016 WL
3627327, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016), aff’d, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part sub
nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 464, 199 L. Ed. 2d 328 (2017), and
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 201
L. Ed. 2d 835 (2018), and rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life
Advocates v. Becerra, 902 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2018). For defendants’ arguments on this point, see also
Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, “The notice requirement is also
narrowly tailored to the stated interest of ensuring that pregnant women are aware of the full spectrum
of pregnancy-related health care services in California because the specific language of the notice
speaks to that entire spectrum. In other words, the notice does not simply mention ‘abortion.’ Rather, the
notice inclusively refers to ‘comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved
methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women.’ § 123472(a)(1). To put it
another way, the notice does not express a particular opinion or view, or make a specific
recommendation. It simply conveys the objective range of information—no more.” National Institute of
Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 2018 WL 388836 (U.S.) at 29.
114. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 844-45 (9th Cir. 2016); Nat’l
Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2377.
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necessary.”115 The state of California argued that it targeted the CPCs because
that is where the deception existed, as there was no documented failure to inform
women of state-funded reproductive services by private clinics offering general
obstetric services. Regardless, the appearance of regulating a pro-life perspective
led the Court, and Justice Kennedy in his concurrence,116 to find that this part of
the legislation was probably viewpoint discrimination, and, at the very least, was
“wildly underinclusive,”117 and thus failed strict scrutiny.118
C. NIFLA Allows Ideological Speakers to Deceive
The problem with classifying the speech of CPCs is that they are less
deceptive in the disclosures they provide online. After requiring several clicks,
the CPC website will state that they do not provide abortions and they counsel
from a pro-life, Christian perspective. However, many of the women seeking a
CPCs services might never visit its website. If they do, they might not read the
fine print in the online disclaimers, or successfully click through the pseudoclinical content to get to their ideological disclosures. This disparity allows CPCs
to advertise as medical clinics but be regulated as ideologues.
In finding that the CPCs are ideological speakers, the Court ignored the
perspective of the listener. As one scholar explained, “the state’s regulatory
authority may be triggered by the fact that an individual holds herself out as a
professional, whether she is actually a professional or not.”119 This suggests that
the clandestine intent of the speaker should not control. If the listener reasonably
believes, based on the objective manifestations of the speaker, that the speaker
is professional, then the speaker’s private, secretive ideology should not provide
for greater First Amendment protection. This view makes abundant sense if the
state’s interest in passing the disclosure ordinance was to protect consumers.
Unfortunately, this is not the approach that the majority took in NIFLA.

115. Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2377 (citing Ibanez v. Florida Dep’t of
Business & Professional Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982);
accord Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24
(1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); cf. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 649 (rejecting
“broad prophylactic rules” in this area)).
116. Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It does appear that viewpoint discrimination is inherent
in the design and structure of this Act.”).
117. Id. at 2375 (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011)).
118. Id. at 2375-76.
119. Hill, supra note 2 at 62 (“In Lowe, the investment adviser had been de-registered and therefore
was no longer technically a licensed professional, but neither Justice White nor Justice Stevens, writing
for the majority, seemed to consider this fact relevant to whether he was engaged in professional speech.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, in considering whether a county could require fortune tellers to have
permits and pay fees in order to operate, applied professional speech standards, although the notion of
including fortune tellers in the same category as doctors and lawyers may, at first glance, seem to be a
stretch. In placing this label on the fortune-teller’s speech, the court emphasized the personalized nature
of the client relationship and the special need for consumer protection, which meant that the state could
require her speech to be licensed.”).
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Given how politicized access to abortion has become, it is no surprise that
the First Amendment has protected politicized speech around abortion services.
However, the NIFLA opinion goes further than necessary to protect deception.
In so doing, the opinion signals to legislatures that consumer protection statutes
cannot provide an effective remedy against CPCs’ deceptive practices. Even if
California gathered sufficient evidence that demonstrated the need to correct
CPC’s deceptive practices, the state would still face the hurdle of this speech
being considered purely ideological. Further, the current Court sent strong
signals that they would dismiss public health state interests as not being
sufficiently compelling. This indicates a tremendous amount of judicial
deference to the CPCs’ speech. If states want to effectively curb CPCs’ deceptive
practices, they will need to pursue other avenues.
II. REGULATING CPCS THROUGH TORT LAW
A. Legal Tools Discussed Thus Far Require the Political Will of Elected
Officials
There are myriad legal tools in the arsenal of the state attorneys general or
legislators who would like to eliminate the misleading practices of pseudoclinics, such as CPCs.
The biggest disadvantage to the public consumer protection statutes that will
be discussed, infra, at Section IV, is that each requires the political will of elected
officials to prosecute CPCs. A private individual cannot prosecute a CPC that
deliberately misleads women, engages in the unauthorized practice of medicine,
or promotes unapproved uses of an FDA-approved device. Unfortunately,
elected officials, including county or state prosecutors, frequently choose not to
champion the rights of women or support women’s reproductive choices. This
means that private women, especially those who live in conservative states,
cannot rely on these consumer protection statutes and regulations to challenge
the CPCs. Without a legal remedy, the rights these measures seek to protect are
meaningless.
B. Tort Law Puts the Injured Party in the Driver’s Seat
It is in this space, where something is either under-regulated or regulations
are under-enforced, that the law of torts does its best and most useful work. This
Article advocates that individual women should sue CPCs in tort law for the
intentional tort of battery. While this approach presents its own challenges
related to the emotional and financial burdens of litigation, as well as the fact
that the litigation comes after the harm has occurred, it still has significant
advantages over passively waiting for prosecution under consumer protection
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statutes. Tort law puts the injured party in the driver’s seat. In contrast to public
actions, which typically involve the remedy of injunctions, a battery lawsuit
allows the plaintiff to receive some compensation from the CPCs, which might
include punitive damages. Finally, it does not in any way undermine public
officials’ ability to enforce deceptive CPC practices through other means. Tort
law can work in tandem with public efforts to minimize the deceptive and
harmful practices of CPCs. But, when officials sit on their hands and allow
consumers to be deceived, torts are a terrific remedy.
A tort claim would function something like the following. Any time that a
woman is touched by a CPC staff member, if the touching is only consented to
through deception by the CPC, she should be able to prevail on a civil battery
claim. Battery honors the individual’s dignity and is not deferential to an industry
standard of care, unlike a case for medical malpractice, which would apply only
if the CPCs were licensed, professional health care providers.
Before explaining why the battery tort is such a great tool for women who
have been injured by a CPC to seek redress, this Article will discuss the history
and purpose behind this old intentional tort, and the ways in which TRAP laws
have perverted the doctrine of battery and informed consent. The use of battery
in this context might help redefine and reclaim this doctrine, to challenge the
frequent pro-life blurring of the medical with the ideological. Informed consent
means something; it is not merely a vehicle through which to shoehorn ideology.
C. The History of Battery and its Elements
The battery cause of action is one of the oldest torts, and has deep roots in
our common law’s desire to protect the personal dignity of individuals and their
ability to decide how, by whom, and under which circumstances they are
touched. This is one of the most basic rights in our common law. To make out a
civil claim of battery, a plaintiff must prove that each of these elements is more
likely than not to have occurred: (1) the defendant intentionally touched the
plaintiff (2) in a way that was objectively harmful or offensive and (3) the
plaintiff did not consent to the touching, nor was it privileged (say, as part of a
lawful police arrest).120
Pregnant women who were misled about the purpose of their visit to the CPC
may bring battery claims against the CPC staff who touched them in offensive
ways, violating their personal dignity.121 A pregnant woman who is examined by
a CPC volunteer and physically touched—including having her pulse taken, but
120. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 85 (2018).
121. W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, 41 (5th ed. 1984)
(“The element of personal indignity involved always has been given considerable weight. Consequently,
the defendant is liable not only for contacts which do actual physical harm, but also for those relatively
trivial ones which are merely offensive and insulting.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 (AM. LAW INSt., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014).
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especially undergoing a vaginal exam or ultrasound—could rather easily make
out a battery claim if she reasonably finds the touching offensive because she
consented to the touching under false pretenses.122 The minority of women who
are not touched by CPC staff, perhaps because they came in for counseling and
left before being seen by one of their volunteers, would not be able to bring a
battery claim. However, it is the physical touching and examination of pregnant
women that leads to the dangers this Article seeks to prevent, as the pregnancy
evaluations and exams are the pseudo-medical activities that create the false
sense that the pregnant women are being seen by licensed physicians. Where
women are only receiving pamphlets, there is less of a risk that they will delay
obtaining proper medical care as a result.
1. Plaintiffs Do Not Need to Prove the CPCs Physically Injured Them
Contrary to popular understanding, the intentional touching need not bruise
or physically injure the plaintiff if the claim is for offensive touching.123 The
“grievance consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and
intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person and not in any physical
harm done to his body.”124 Examples of offensive touching include spitting in
someone’s face,125 removing someone’s hat,126 or tackling someone too
aggressively in a junior-high football league.127
Further, the plaintiff need not even be aware at the time that a battery took
place. The insult to the plaintiff’s integrity “is as keenly felt by one who only
knows after the event that an indignity has been perpetrated upon him as by one
who is conscious of it while it is being perpetrated.”128 Thus, a surgeon who
examines an anesthetized person without her consent could be liable for a
battery. So too could a man who kisses a woman, without waking her, while she
is asleep.129
2. Plaintiffs Do Not Need to Prove that the CPC Had Malicious Intent
To satisfy the intentional component of the battery claim, courts merely
require that the touching was voluntary and the defendant intended to make
122. Brittany A. Campbell, The Crisis Inside Crisis Pregnancy Centers: How to Stop These
Facilities from Depriving Women of Their Reproductive Freedom, 37 B.C.J.L. & SOC. JUST. 73, 75
(2017) (“The nurse attempted an external ultrasound, but because she claimed that the images were
unclear, the nurse told Nicole she needed to perform a transvaginal scan instead, without explaining the
intricacies of the procedure.”).
123. Richard J. Kohlman, Assault and Battery, 1 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 613 (3d ed. 2017).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
125. Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872); Draper v. Baker, 21 N.W. 527 (1884).
126. Seigel v. Long, 53 So. 753 (1910).
127. Koffman v. Garnett, 574 S.E.2d 258 (2003).
128. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1934)
129. Id.
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contact with someone’s person. This just means that the actor’s movement
cannot be the result of an automatic reflex, such as a knee-jerk reaction, epileptic
seizure, or coercion.130 There is no required intent to injure or offend, and there
is no need to prove that the actor was “inspired by any personal hostility.”131
Indeed, even a friendly practical joke can lead to a battery claim.132 While courts
continue to bungle this standard, it remains the black letter common law,
endorsed by the Restatement of Torts, that defendants need not intend to cause a
harmful touching.133 They need merely intend to touch the plaintiff, in a way that
turns out to be harmful or offensive.134
3. Plaintiffs Must Prove the Touching Was Objectively Offensive
To be objectively offensive, the touching must offend a community standard
of what is considered appropriate. It is not enough that the individual herself be
subjectively offended. Thus, a hug might not be objectively offensive, so long as
it was not accompanied by other inappropriate language or intimidation.
Touching someone’s shoulder in a crowded subway would likely also fail to be
objectively offensive. The context matters greatly, and courts factor in the
“usages of a decent society,” “polite manners,” and touching that is “customary
. . . in the course of life.”135 The factfinder should consider any power imbalance,
exploitation, or subordination in determining whether the touching is offensive.
There is nothing customary or polite about allowing a stranger to touch your
body, assess your medical situation, and offer personal reproductive advice—all
under false pretenses. No one could say that it is unreasonable to be offended by
such things. When we agree to the most intimate form of examination, and the
most intimate form of counseling, it is not unreasonable to only do so when we
think the person touching us is a licensed medical provider. A reasonable jury
could easily find the touching by CPC staff offensive, even if a few pregnant
women testified for the defense that they were not personally offended by
fraudulent touching at the pseudo-clinics.136 Just as it does not matter whether

130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 (AM. LAW INSt.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INSt.1965).
132. Id. § 19; see also id. § 20 (1965); Fuerschbach v. Southwest Airlines, 439 F.3d 1197, 1209
(Cal. 2006).
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 (AM. LAW INSt.,
Discussion Draft, 2014).
134. “The fact that the Wagners allege that Mr. Giese could not have intended to harm her, or
understood that his attack would inflict injury or offense, is not relevant to the analysis of whether a
battery occurred. So long as he intended to make that contact, and so long as that contact was one to
which Mrs. Wagner had not given her consent, either expressly or by implication, he committed a
battery.” Wagner v. Utah Dep’t of Human Servs., 122 P.3d 599, 610 (Utah 2005).
135. Id. at 609 (“[F]or example, someone who shakes his hand against his silent wishes has not
committed a harmful or offensive contact.”).
136. Glover v. Oppleman, 178 F. Supp. 2d 622, 641 (W.D. Va. 2001).
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one person might not find an uninvited kiss, or blowing smoke in one’s face,
offensive, it does not matter whether a minority of women find the touching
unobjectionable. The question for the courts is whether it is objectively
reasonable for this plaintiff to be offended by the violation of her personal
dignity, once she realizes the real motivation of the CPC.
It is hard to imagine a touching that could be more offensive—asking a
woman to expose her belly or submit to a vaginal exam, revealing private
information about a pregnancy or a fetus that is growing inside of her (and
possibly information about miscarriage or anatomical defects). If the woman
agrees to this, it is almost always because she considers this to be a clinical
encounter, and not an ideological one. If the CPC’s deceptive touching is not a
violation of one’s dignity and right to control who gets to touch oneself, then it
is hard to see what would be. The only way a judge could find that this sort of
unconsented to touching was not a battery would be by misapplying the common
law of civil battery for political ends. Indeed, the CPCs must know that women
would not otherwise consent to such touching, or they would not work so hard,
and fight all the way up to the Supreme Court, to deceive women in their
advertising practices. Why do the CPCs try to take control of the conversation
and mislead women about the nature of their services? Because they know that
without the misleading tactics, they would not be granted access to pregnant
women’s bodies.
4. Misrepresentations Vitiate Consent
In some states, the plaintiff needs to prove that the touching was not
consented to, while in other states this is an affirmative defense the defendant
must raise. Either way, if it is shown that the plaintiff reasonably misunderstood
the purpose of the touching, due to misrepresentations by the defendant, then
consenting to the medical exam or procedure will not bar her claim. Courts have
long recognized that a plaintiff might have technically consented to a blood draw,
for example, but thought the blood draw was for medical purposes. If the blood
draw were instead for law enforcement purposes, the consent is invalid.137
The “crux of a battery claim is an absence of consent on the part of the
plaintiff.”138 Consent is contextual. A famous Torts treatise even uses a medical
example to make this point. It states: the “plaintiff who consents to manipulation
of her body in the belief that it is for medical purposes, when in fact it is only for
the sexual gratification of the defendant,” can have a cause of action for
battery.139 You could substitute “sexual gratification” for “attempting to do
God’s work” and the same premise holds. The action for battery recognizes that
137. O’Brien v. Synnott, 72 A.3d 331, 335-36 (Vt. 2013).
138. Shaw v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 973 F. Supp. 539, 547 (D. Md. 1997).
139. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (2d ed. 2018).
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the individual has a right to exclude others from touching her and to control the
way they do so. Full stop.
There are four different types of consent applicable to our facts, and
satisfying the criteria for any of them would preclude liability: actual consent;
apparent or implied consent; constructive consent; and the emergency
doctrine.140 However, none of these categories of consent apply to preclude
liability for the CPCs. First, there is no actual (express or implied) consent in the
case where a pregnant woman is never explicitly told that the medically
costumed volunteer is in fact unlicensed.141
Likewise, the CPC cannot rely on “reasonably apparent consent,” or implied
consent.142 While a patient might consent to “ordinary physical contacts that are
medically necessary” when she visits her doctor for her annual physical, consent
to the CPC cannot be inferred from the facts. In the oft-cited case of O’Brien v.
Cunard S.S. Co.,143 the evidence that plaintiff held out her arm to be vaccinated,
in a line of people exiting a ship, demonstrated not only that the defendant
reasonably believed that she consented, but also that she did consent. This sort
of implied consent is not present here; the pregnant woman is not implicitly
consenting to a medical exam by the CPC. She is consenting to an exam by a
different person and in a different context.
While a defendant would not be liable for battery if a reasonable person in
the position of the actor believes that the would-be plaintiff consented to the
actor’s otherwise tortious conduct,144 it would be unreasonable for a CPC staff
member to believe that the pregnant woman had truly consented, given the
CPC’s ideological agenda. As mentioned, supra at note 35 and the
accompanying text, CPC staff are trained in applying deceptive practices to
persuade women to carry the fetus to term. CPCs take advantage of these
women’s relative lack of education, money, and insurance to deceive them into
thinking they are receiving medical, as opposed to ideological, care. Given their
deceptive playbook, and the fact that they do not tell pregnant women who
appear at their clinics that they are unlicensed medical providers who do not
provide the full range of reproductive services, consent to the touching cannot

140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 111 (AM. LAW INSt.,
Discussion Draft, 2014).
141. “Express consent may be given by words or affirmative conduct and implied consent may be
manifested when a person takes no action, indicating an apparent willingness for the conduct to
occur. The consent must be to the ‘defendant’s conduct, rather than to its consequences.’ A
plaintiff’s consent is not effective if “the consenting person was mistaken about the nature and quality of
the invasion intended by the conduct.” Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 148 (3d Cir. 1998).
142. “If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be regarded as consent, they
constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact...In determining whether conduct
would be understood by a reasonable person as indicating consent, the customs of the community are to
be taken into account.” Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1219 (10th Cir. 2003).
143. 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891).
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 115 (AM. LAW INSt.,
Discussion Draft, 2014).
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be inferred or apparent from the facts. Indeed, given how CPCs deliberately
locate very near Planned Parenthoods and adopt clinically-sounding names, the
very reasonable and clear intention of CPCs is to gain access to women’s bodies
through deception, not informed consent.
Further, as discussed above under the “objectively offensive” element of
battery, there is no constructive consent either. Several courts have recognized
that “in a crowded world, a certain amount of personal contact is inevitable, and
must be accepted. Absent expression to the contrary, consent is assumed to all
those ordinary contacts which are customary and reasonably necessary to the
common intercourse of life.”145 Examples of this include touching someone
while hastily exiting a building during a fire alarm or brushing up against
someone on a crowded bus. In those circumstances, there is something like a
social necessity argument, as affordable public transportation requires “minor
contact between passengers.”146 Commuters are thought to consent to this
touching, as they are aware of the crowded nature of most public transit and
nonetheless agree to this mode of transportation. But there is no such social
consent in the present case. Pregnant women are not agreeing to a certain amount
of battery in order to take advantage of a public good.
Finally, emergency consent is not applicable. The emergency consent
doctrine “reflects a narrow set of circumstances in which the actor reasonably
believes that plaintiff would have consented, if he or she had the opportunity to
do so, and in which it is imperative not to wait to see whether plaintiff really
does consent.”147 In the kinds of cases contemplated here, there is plenty of time
to obtain the pregnant woman’s consent. Failure to do so is not because there is
an urgent, life-threatening clinical need that prevents asking the woman. The
only reason the consent is not explicit is because the CPCs appreciate that they
will lose access to women’s bodies if they are transparent about their ideological
purpose.
Thus, CPCs cannot avail themselves of any of the relevant types of consent
to preclude their liability. CPCs that misled a woman into thinking that the
purpose of the exam was to diagnose a pregnancy, or to offer medical counseling
or advice, when the real purpose is to counsel the woman on pro-life, Christian
ideology, would most certainly be liable in battery. To reiterate, where the
consent to a procedure or touching is premised on fraud or misrepresentations,
there is no valid consent.148
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 117 (AM. LAW INSt.,
Discussion Draft, 2014).
146. Id. The Restatement adds, “Minor contact between passengers is reasonably necessary to
achieve that [affordable and efficient public transit] social value.” Id.
147. Id. § 118.
148. “The plaintiff’s purported consent is ineffective to bar her claim if it is induced by
misrepresentation or is given under a material mistake of which the defendant is or should be aware. The
mistake is frequently though not always induced by the defendant’s fraud or misrepresentation. Many
cases decided in many settings summarize the point by saying that ‘fraud vitiates consent’ or that
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Battery Claims Do Not Balance the Rights to Batter Against the Right
Not to be Battered

Contrary to the First Amendment analysis in NIFLA or the structure of
consumer protection or even medical malpractice laws, which might give too
much deference to the defendant’s viewpoints or purpose, here, the reasons why
the defendant battered the plaintiff are largely irrelevant.149 When the touching
is not consented to, courts do not balance the interests of the batterer against the
interests of the battered. The battery cause of action is about protecting the
inviolate dignity of the individual person. In keeping with this, battery is not a
paternalistic or ideological doctrine. The defendant cannot argue that they failed
to disclose a material fact about the procedure in order to avoid any
psychological harm to the plaintiff.150 Where the First Amendment may be
interpreted in a way that protects misleading practices by CPCs, battery does not
spare defendants who deliberately mislead.
D. The Relationship Between Battery and Informed Consent
In recent years, many states have passed special informed consent laws that
are exclusive to the abortion context. These Targeted Regulation of Abortion
Provider (TRAP) laws require abortion providers to say specific things to
pregnant women as part of the informed consent process. Given that informed
consent as a legal and ethical doctrine developed from the tort of battery, it will
be useful to discuss how this occurred, in order to understand how these TRAP
laws pervert the very notion of informed consent.
Historically, informed consent suits began as intentional torts for
unconsented-to touching by physicians, even where the care received was not
negligent. One of the first cases to recognize the trespass to persons against a
surgeon who operated on someone without her consent was Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital.151 In this 1914 case, the plaintiff claimed that the
hospital staff removed her stomach tumor while she was under anesthesia,
despite her explicit requests that they not do so.152 In deciding that the hospital
consent is ineffective if given as a result of fraud, meaning that the plaintiff in such a case can recover.”
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 139.
149. “[M]any torts that are classified as intentional differ from torts of negligence not so much
because they represent a more serious degree of fault, but because they exhibit a type of fault not
appropriately governed by the ‘reasonable care’ paradigm: They focus on protection of carefully defined
interests (such as freedom from confinement, and choice about medical treatment or other physical
touchings), while they limit legal protection to the most deliberate kinds of intrusions on these
interests.” Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061,
1100 (2006).
150. Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1986).
151. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated by Bing v.
Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
152. Id.
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could be liable for a battery, if not for negligence, Judge Cardozo famously stated
that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages.”153 A 1913 Oklahoma case further recognized that the skillful removal
of a patient’s bone could constitute a battery, where the patient had not consented
to its removal.154 Thus, even where there is not negligence, there can be a medical
battery.
In the medical context, the intentional tort has morphed into a negligence
cause of action in all but a few states.155 This is because enough of a norm has
developed through medical ethics and practice to say that the failure to provide
relevant medical information to a patient, about the purpose and risks of their
treatment, is now a breach of the professional standard of care. The American
Medical Association has issued an ethics opinion, which states that “informed
consent to medical treatment is fundamental in both ethics and law.”156 For
medical professionals, what started as a battery is now considered medical
malpractice. Where CPC facilities and staff are licensed as medical providers in
their states, then, pregnant women should sue them for ordinary negligence and
medical malpractice. Because it is recognized that medical providers should
inform women of the purpose of their care, as well as the risks and benefits of
any procedures, an informed consent claim should be easy to demonstrate.
Importantly, while the Supreme Court declared in NIFLA that CPCs are not
practicing medicine, and therefore the informed consent requirements of Casey
did not apply, it is up to the states, and not federal courts, to determine whether
entities are practicing medicine and subjected to professional malpractice claims
under state law.157

153. Id.
154. Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96, 97 (Okla. 1913).
155. “Often informed consent claims blur into malpractice claims.” JANET DOLGIN & LOIS
SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 59 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2d ed. 2009). See also Bryan J. Warren,
Pennsylvania Medical Informed Consent Law: A Call to Protect Patient Autonomy Rights by
Abandoning the Battery Approach, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 917, 918 (2000); West’s A.L.R. Digest Health
k907, ALRDG 198HK907 (2018). But see Perez v. Hu, 87 N.E.3d 1130, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)
(“Lack of informed consent is viewed as a battery claim if there is an alleged complete lack of consent
to medical treatment, but otherwise it is ‘regarded as a specific form of negligence for breach of the
required standard of professional conduct.’”); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 507 A.2d
718 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
156. Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.amaassn.org/delivering-care/informed-consent [https://perma.cc/6ARD-Z9WT] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
157. The joint opinion in Casey explained that the law regulated speech only ‘as part of the
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.’” Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (emphasis added). Indeed, the
requirement that a doctor obtain informed consent to perform an operation is “firmly entrenched in
American tort law.” Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 269 (1990). See, e.g.,
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (explaining that ‘a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault.’”).
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Canterbury v. Spence, one of the early cases to describe the tort of informed
consent, stated that “[t]rue consent to what happens to one’s self is the informed
exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably
the options available and the risks attendant upon each.”158 Today, making out a
case for informed consent requires proving that the defendant breached a
standard of care in terms of what reasonable physicians would share with a
patient, or what prudent patients would find material to their decision to elect or
forego treatment.159 The former standard asks what information a reasonable
physician would provide, and reflects the idea that physicians cannot read
patients’ minds to know what each would subjectively want to know. The latter
“prudent patient” standard is applied in a slight minority of states, and focuses
on the “risks, benefits, and options that a reasonable patient would want to know
in reaching a treatment decision.”160 It is rooted in patient autonomy, and
recognizes that while the physician may have expertise in clinical decisionmaking, she is not an expert in what reasonable patients would want to have
disclosed.
1. TRAP Laws Pervert the Doctrine of Informed Consent
Ironically, an article about abortion access could not address battery and
informed consent without recognizing the absurd turns the doctrine has taken
under states’ TRAP laws. TRAP laws are
part of anti-abortion activists’ strategy to chip away at the legal availability
of abortion . . . by heavily regulating the practice of providing abortions.
These laws are examples of abortion exceptionalism, in which abortion is
singled out for more restrictive government regulation as compared to other,
similar procedures.161
Legislators often justify these TRAP laws as being necessary for true informed
consent, and many TRAP laws are placed in sections of the state code that apply
to medical informed consent generally. A majority of states have such laws,
which place requirements on abortion providers “that are more demanding than

158. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
159. “In slightly over half the states, the legal standard for disclosure to patients is that which a
“reasonable medical practitioner” would provide. This professionally defined standard is often that of
the locality in which the practitioner works, or a similar locality. The disclosure standard in most other
jurisdictions is that which would be sought by a prudent or reasonable patient, a standard that
emphasizes the value of patient autonomy over that of professional judgment.” Peter H. Schuck,
Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 916 (1994).
160. DOLGIN, supra note 155, at 49-50.
161. Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate
Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 2-3 (2012).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3345301

2018]

Crisis at the Pregnancy Center: Regulating Pseudo-Clinics

37

for any other medical procedure.”162 Occasionally, these TRAP laws pervert the
legal and ethical doctrine of informed consent.
For example, under the guise of “informed consent,” many states require
physicians to provide specific, and sometimes misleading, information to
women. An analysis of the mandatory pre-abortion informed consent materials
in 23 states revealed that 45 percent of the statements about first trimester fetal
development were medically inaccurate.163 Examples of inaccuracies included
statements such as “brain activity can be recorded” at four-weeks’ gestation, or
other statements that reported “baby-like” behaviors before they could be
seen.164
In addition to misinformation related to the development of the fetus,
Missouri requires that the physician inform the pregnant woman that “[t]he life
of each human being begins at conception. Abortion will terminate the life of a
separate, unique, living human being.”165 Of course this blurs objective clinical
information with religious ideology. It is ethically unsound to ask physicians to
deliver propaganda for conservative legislators, shrouded in the veil of
professional judgment. In any event, this uses the legitimate and professional
voices of physicians as shoehorns for ideology, by erroneously treating it like
other forms of medical informed consent.
In Texas, women must be incorrectly told that having an abortion “may
make it difficult or impossible to become pregnant in the future or carry a
pregnancy to term.”166 In South Dakota, women are given information that
abortion increases the risk of infertility, without making it clear that only a highly
unlikely complication will increase this risk.167 Indiana provides some caveats,
but the informed consent materials nonetheless leave the reader with the
impression that abortion carries with it an increased risk of infertility and
complications with future pregnancies. 168 Of course, this depends greatly on the
gestational age of the fetus. Unqualified statements about abortion causing
infertility are medically inaccurate, and yet physicians are required to share this
false data in at least four states.169 In Indiana, pregnant women must be told that
162. Id. at 13.
163. Cynthia Daniels, et al., Informed or Misinformed Consent, Abortion Policy in the United
States, 41 J. OF HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 181, 193 (2016).
164. Id. at 191, 195.
165. MO. DEP’T OF HEALTH & SENIOR SERVICES, MO. INFORMED CONSENT BOOKLET,
http://health.mo.gov/living/families/womenshealth/pregnancyassistance/pdf/InformedConsentBooklet.p
df [https://perma.cc/V7XW-YBZ8].
166. TEX. DEP’T OF HEALTH, A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW 17 (2003),
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/wrtk/pdf/booklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JHP-YAMG].
167. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2017).
168. IND. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, ABORTION INFORMED CONSENT BROCHURE 6,
https://www.in.gov/isdh/files/Abortion_Informed_Consent_Brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZT3VSVB].
169. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, Oct. 2018,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion
[https://perma.cc/GK7T-BRDG].
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the fetus must be either buried in an “established cemetery” or “cremated” by the
abortion clinic.170
In thirteen states, women must be instructed on the ability of a fetus to feel
pain.171 In Utah, physicians must share with pregnant women the puzzling
statement that “substantial medical evidence” has shown that the “fetus is
capable of feeling pain,” and thus anesthesia must be provided if the abortion is
performed after 20 weeks’ gestation.172 First, there is no substantial evidence of
this,173 and second, providing anesthesia would impose a significant risk on the
pregnant woman and the fetus that may not be clinically justified. Requiring
anesthesia after 20 weeks, for every pregnancy, violates norms of professional
ethics, as the physician should not do harm to the patient that is not balanced by
some corresponding benefit.174
The presence of these “fetal pain” laws is even more confounding given that
full-term, natural childbirth can be very painful for the baby. Objectively, this is
a stressful event. Their 40 week skulls are compressed, their heart rate increases,
and their bodies are mangled—but there is no requirement that a vaginal delivery
be preceded by anesthesia in Utah or elsewhere. The discrepancy between the
requirement that physicians administer anesthesia during abortions at 20 weeks,
but not at full-term vaginal deliveries, reveals the true purpose behind these
laws—to discourage women’s reproductive choices. Requiring a doctor to
deliver this message again blurs the line between the clinical and the ideological.
This is quite dangerous in a society predicated on secular delivery of health care
and freedom of religious exercise. Indeed, the informed consent laws of Missouri
are presently being challenged by a religious group that claims that in their view,

170. IND. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 168, at 11.
171. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 169. For a constitutional analysis, see I. Glenn Cohen &
Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the Constitution, 39 J. L., MED., & ETHICS 235
(2011).
172. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-7-305, 76-7-308.5 (LexisNexis 2018) (“. . . [s]ubstantial medical
evidence from studies concludes that an unborn child who is at least 20 weeks gestational age may be
capable of experiencing pain during an abortion procedure . . . and the physician “shall administer an
anesthetic or analgesic to eliminate or alleviate organic pain to the unborn child caused by the particular
method of abortion to be employed.”).
173. Madeleine Verriotis et al., The Development of the Nociceptive Brain, 338 NEUROSCIENCE
207, 208 (2016) (“How and when this complex brain network develops to encode noxious stimuli and
create the experience of pain is an important area of current research.”). See also Curtis Lowery et al.,
Neurodevelopmental Changes of Fetal Pain, 410 SEMINARS IN PERINATOLOGY 275, 275 (2009)
(“Mature thalamocortical projections are not present until 29 to 30 weeks, which has led many to
believe the fetus does not experience emotional ‘pain’ until then. Pain requires both nociception and
emotional reaction or interpretation.”).
174. See Andrea Smardon, Abortion Providers in Utah Adapt to New Anesthesia Requirement,
NPR, April 7, 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/04/07/473416741/abortion-providers-in-utah-adapt-tonew-anesthesia-requirement [https://perma.cc/5422-EC6M]. Medical ethics requires respect for
autonomy and beneficence toward patients. These are “two of the fundamental principles” that govern
patient interactions. Beneficence requires physicians to promote good and act in the best interest of the
patient’s health. Thus, physicians should not do things that harm patients, with very little benefit. See
Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-Making: The Quest for
Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 86 (2010).
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human life does not begin at conception, and the informed consent materials
violate the Establishment Clause by endorsing Christian ideology.175
2. TRAP Laws Ignore Casey’s Dicta on Informed Consent
The 1992 Supreme Court case Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey made it clear that states can require physicians to inform
women seeking abortion about the physiological development of the fetus or the
risks of the abortion procedure.176 However, this was conditioned on the
information being truthful and non-misleading,177 and allowing the physician to
use her judgment to customize the information to the particular patient.178 The
Casey Court made their reasoning explicit: it was not to add extraordinary
informed consent in the abortion arena, but to place informed consent on equal
footing with other areas of medicine. The message was that informed consent in
abortion should be “no different” and the doctor-patient relation was “entitled to
the same solicitude it receives in other contexts.”179 Further, in recognizing that
previous abortion informed consent laws had been struck down, the Court
distinguished those in Casey by stating that Pennsylvania’s laws were not
“designed to dissuade the woman from having an abortion” and did not “impose
a rigid requirement that a specific body of information be given in all cases,
irrespective of the particular needs of the patient.”180 In NIFLA, discussed supra
at [x], the Court narrowed the holding of Casey so that it only applied to licensed
medical providers immediately before providing an abortion procedure.
Legislators who have passed TRAP laws that require physicians to provide
medically inaccurate or misleading information have ignored this important dicta
from Casey.181 The part of Casey getting more attention is the general
requirement that a TRAP law not place an “undue burden” on the exercise of the
woman’s right. Casey’s undue burden test holds that “a provision of law is
175. Doe v. Greitens, 530 S.W.3d 571 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). See also Linley Sanders, Abortion
Rights Fight Has an Unlikely Champion: The Satanic Temple, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 2017,
http://www.newsweek.com/satanic-temple-pushes-abortion-fight-missouri-supreme-court-679779
[https://perma.cc/Y2CU-8X6E].
176. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
177. Id.
178. “Critical to our decisions in Akron and Thornburgh to invalidate a governmental intrusion into
the patient-doctor dialogue was the fact that the laws in both cases required all doctors within their
respective jurisdictions to provide all pregnant patients contemplating an abortion a litany of
information, regardless of whether the patient sought the information or whether the doctor thought the
information necessary to the patient’s decision.” Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991).
179. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
180. Id. at 882.
181. Indeed, following Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, these types of TRAP laws will be
under greater scrutiny. Given that Whole Women’s Health stated that courts can look to common sense
and the actual effects of TRAP laws on a woman’s constitutional rights, as opposed to speculating about
whether the state’s interests are narrowly tailored, it will be crucial to collect data on how TRAP laws
unduly burden the right to terminate. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2317
(2016) (“Courts are free to base their findings on commonsense inferences drawn from the evidence.”).
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invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion.”182 The Circuits were somewhat split in terms of
how to interpret this language and how much deference to give to empirical
evidence to demonstrate an undue burden. However, the Supreme Court in
Whole Woman’s Health offered guidance, stating that “[c]ourts are free to base
their findings on commonsense inferences drawn from the evidence.”183
Regardless of how future courts interpret this important test, however, legislators
have deliberately ignored it, and Casey’s dicta on informed consent, when
fashioning pro-life TRAP laws.184 This is perhaps because they were setting up
legal challenges to Casey itself, anticipating the replacement of Justice Kennedy
on the Supreme Court.185
Informed consent is not some slippery placeholder that means whatever you
want it to mean. It has a history and specific content. Informed consent means
that accurate, relevant information will be shared with a competent patient, who
will have adequate time to process it, understand it, and then use this information
to make a voluntary medical decision.186 According to the American Medical
Association’s Opinion on this matter, “[s]uccessful communication in the
patient-physician relationship fosters trust and supports shared decision
making,” and thus physicians must “[p]resent relevant information accurately
and sensitively, in keeping with the patient’s preferences for receiving medical
information.”187 The pregnant woman’s decision can be neither voluntary nor

182. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. However, as John Robertson has pointed out, “finding an improper
purpose to stop abortion or burden women will be rare, given the legitimate fetal-protection, health, and
autonomy concerns that might motivate legislators . . . .” John A. Robertson, Science Disputes in
Abortion Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1852 (2015). Instead, as the Supreme Court recognized in Whole
Woman’s Health, the second prong of the undue burden test may be met with empirical, common sense
data on the actual effect these laws have on women’s access to abortion.
183. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2317.
184. FOR A RECENT EXAMPLE, SEE THE 2018 PROPOSED BILL IN THE UTAH STATE
LEGISLATURE MAKING ABORTION ILLEGAL AT ANY POINT IN THE PREGNANCY, IF THE PURPOSE IS TO
TERMINATE A FETUS WITH TRISOMY 21. THE LEGISLATORS WERE ADVISED BY THE STATE’S LEGISLATIVE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE THAT THIS BILL WOULD VIOLATE CASEY, BUT THE SPONSORS PURSUED IT
NONETHELESS. SEE, LUKE Ramseth, Here’s what you need to know about Utah’s proposed Down
syndrome abortion ban, Salt Lake Tribune, March 4, 2018, available online at
https://www.sltrib.com/news/health/2018/03/04/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-utahs-proposeddown-syndrome-abortion-ban/]
185. While not the focus of this article, the replacement of Justice Kennedy with Justice
Kavanaugh, nominated by President Trump, is likely to move the Supreme Court in a significantly more
conservative direction as it relates to reproductive rights. Justice Kennedy had three times affirmed the
basic holding of Roe v. Wade—by signing on to the majority of Casey; by assuming it was controlling in
the Carhart opinion that he wrote; and in signing on to the opinion in Whole Woman’s Health. For a
brief summary of Justice Kavanaugh’s position on reproductive rights, and Roe v. Wade, please see
Clare Foran and Joan Biskupic, Where Brett Kavanaugh stands on key issues, CNN, Oct. 6, 2018,
available online at: https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/09/politics/kavanaugh-on-the-issues/index.html; and
see also, Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court just gave us its first view of how it will handle abortion in
the Kavanaugh era, Think Progress, Dec. 10, 2018, available online at
https://thinkprogress.org/supreme-court-abortion-kavanaugh-05ac30d8b22a/
186. See generally Schuck, supra note 159, at 902-05.
187. Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, supra note 156.
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informed if it is based on misrepresentations. But this is precisely what many
TRAP laws, and deceptive CPCs, do.
As Judith Daar correctly points out, the “informed consent” TRAP laws blur
ethical clinical judgment with legislative ideology. According to Professor Daar,
informed consent is not well supported when TRAP laws “foist a scripted
message displaying the state’s moral repugnance to the proposed treatment
plan.”188 Scholars in medical ethics have generally agreed that this requires
physicians to “commit an untenable ethical and professional wrong—deceiving
their patients by providing false information and withholding empirically
derived, evidence-based clinical data.”189 Even so, as Jessie Hill points out,
“courts tend to be highly permissive” of TRAP laws, while “they have often been
more skeptical of disclosure requirements imposed on [CPCs].”190 It is this
federal First Amendment jurisprudence protecting CPC deception that begs for
a private, state tort remedy.
E. The Practical Advantages of Battery Over Negligence Claims
Battery places the victim of the harm in the driver’s seat, allowing her to
decide whom to sue and for how much. Battery also entitles the plaintiff to
potential punitive damages, in addition to any damages for her pain and suffering
or dignitary harm.191 While punitive damages are rare, they are more likely to be
awarded in intentional tort cases where there is willful misconduct, malice, or
reckless disregard for the rights of others.192 If the jury finds that the particular
CPC defendant willfully misled the plaintiff in order to get her to carry her
pregnancy to term, then punitive damages might be warranted. This could make
the lawsuit more attractive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to take on a contingency basis,
which might improve access to justice for low-income women.
Given that most states follow the physician-standard for informed consent,
these cases will often require expert testimony as to what the physician should
have disclosed. It can often be difficult for plaintiffs to find a physician who will

188. Judith Daar, Distinctions in Disclosure: Mandated Informed Consent in Abortion and ART, 43
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 255, 256 (2015).
189. Howard Minkoff & Mary Faith Marshall, Government-Scripted Consent: When Medical
Ethics and Law Collide, 39 HASTINGS CTR REP. 21, 21 (2009).
190. Hill, supra note 2, at 60 (“Thus, in contrast to the strict scrutiny that applies to compelled
speech in the context of what may be called ‘public discourse,’ the Court implied that only rational basis
review is applicable to restrictions and speech requirements in the professional speech context, at least
where, as in Casey, the speech is found to be truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant to the woman’s
decision.”).
191. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (AM. LAW. INST.
2012) (“An actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional harm to another is subject to liability for that emotional harm and, if the emotional harm
causes bodily harm, also for the bodily harm.”); Kohlman, supra note 123.
192. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 536-37 (4th ed. 2016).
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testify against another local physician in this regard. Further, even under the
patient-standard, in order to prove the causation element of negligence the
plaintiff needs to prove that, had she been adequately informed, she would have
chosen to do something different. It is often difficult to prove causation, even
where the patient could prove that some information was negligently withheld.
Will the jury believe the claim that the patient would have chosen differently?
In these respects, a battery claim is easier to prove. The battery plaintiff need
not prove that the physician had a duty to disclose anything, that the failure was
a breach of a professional standard of care, or that she would have chosen not to
have the exam had she known its true nature.193 The battery cause of action is
much more protective of the physical integrity of the plaintiff and does not
balance this interest against the rights of the defendant. In a battery claim, there
is no deference to the community or industry practices of defendants.
Given that the petitioner in NIFLA claimed that it was not providing medical
care, a civil plaintiff could cite this when arguing that an informed consent claim
would be inappropriate for a plaintiff who is seen at an unlicensed CPC. But,
more appropriately, the problem with an informed consent claim is that the
defendant CPC is not a medical provider, and the elaborate ethical canons that
have developed for physicians do not apply to unlicensed CPCs. The CPC
plaintiff is not technically a patient, even if she thinks that she is. It is the unique
position of the physician, and the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship,
that has led to the development of informed consent as a claim. You cannot bring
an informed consent-style claim against your auto-mechanic or plumber, nor can
you bring one against a CPC. Instead, you would need to prove battery or
ordinary negligence by the defendant. Under ordinary negligence, given that the
plaintiff would be arguing that inadequate information was shared, this claim
would be framed as a “failure to warn” type of claim.
Failure to warn claims are notoriously difficult to win. This is because the
common law does not impose affirmative duties to protect or warn on just any
defendant; there must be a special relationship between the parties. Historically,
the special relationship has been one where there is a power imbalance between
the plaintiff and defendant, where the defendant is a fiduciary of the plaintiff, or
where the plaintiff puts her safety or person in the custody of the defendant. The
classic “special relationship” that give rise to a duty to warn are landlord/tenant,
doctor/patient, and business/customer relationships.
The CPC facility, in taking on a pseudo-clinical function and holdings its
doors open to the public to provide counseling services, would quite likely be
considered in a “special relationship” with the pregnant woman. Thus, the CPC
would likely be under a duty to protect and warn the women it sees in its pseudoclinic, even when it is unlicensed. This could create obvious duties to provide

193. See Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1986).
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accurate and complete information to the woman. However, this argument would
depend on the judge and her notions of what makes for good public policy. The
judge makes decisions about whether there is a duty by looking to a long list of
factors. Given the political context in which abortion cases are decided, and the
historical inability for judges to treat abortion as unexceptional in tort,194 the
negligence cause of action against CPCs is not as desirable as a battery claim.
Moreover, damages in a negligence or informed consent case might be
modest. Typically, negligence damages are awarded to pay for economic
expenses and pain and suffering that result as a consequence of the breach.
However, many states limit the amount of pain and suffering damages that can
be awarded and might limit the economic damages if they are framed as caring
for a healthy, unwanted, child. Such claims are unfortunately referred to as
“wrongful birth” claims.
If the negligence case is framed as a failure to provide adequate information
that resulted in the birth of a child, some states prohibit this type of claim
because, in their view, the birth of a child can never be an injury.195 States are
about evenly split on whether they will allow for some recovery for the cost of
raising a child when the traditional negligence elements are met.196 Some states
will only allow for compensatory damages for child-rearing expenses when the
child that is born has severe disabilities. This makes “wrongful birth” claims
exceptional, when in reality calculating the damages from child care and medical
expenses are quite ordinary, but courts have struggled with the philosophical
implications of allowing the birth of a child to be an injury.197 If, instead, the
claim is brought as a battery claim, the plaintiff will dodge this philosophical
bullet. However, depending on the jurisdiction, the plaintiff may not be able to
receive damages for regular child-rearing expenses.

194. Judges struggle to apply basic tort concepts about compensatory damages to wrongful birth
cases, given that the successful wrongful birth claim requires the parents to argue that they would have
had an abortion had the physician informed them of material clinical information. See generally
Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1117 (Md. 2002); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (N.J. 1984);
Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 958 (Cal. 1982).
195. CHARLES KRAUSE, ALFRED GANS & MONIQUE LEAHY, 2A AM. L. OF TORTS §§ 9:27-28
(2018) (“The major obstacle to an infant plaintiff’s claim in such a case is the determination of
damages.”).
196. Id. § 9:27.
197. Schirmer v. Mt. Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecologic Assoc., Inc., 844 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ohio
2006) (“Birth of a normal, healthy child cannot be an injury to her parents.”).
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IV. REGULATING CPCS AS PRACTICING MEDICINE WITHOUT A LICENSE
A. Medical Licensing Laws Protect the Public and Have Been Deemed
Constitutional
NIFLA teaches states they will need to pursue other non-pregnancy-specific
options if they want to protect their citizens from deceptive CPC practices. The
next option that will be explored is the prosecution of CPCs for the unlicensed
practice of medicine. Even the petitioners in NIFLA acknowledged this
possibility, though they seemed confident that they were not practicing medicine.
Assuming, arguendo, that NIFLA does not practice medicine under a free speech
analysis, many states would likely disagree that CPCs are not practicing
medicine. In a bit of a taunt, NIFLA’s attorney granted that “[i]t’s illegal to
pretend to practice medicine without a license,” so “[i]f that’s what’s going on
here, surely California would have found a way to [prosecute CPCs] before
now.”198 Of course, this is a different remedy, with different applicable standards
and constitutional review, but it is something California, and other states, could
and should do.
Every state prohibits the unauthorized practice of medicine, and then defines
what constitutes the “practice of medicine” for that state.199 New York has a
representative law, which defines the practice of medicine as “diagnosing,
treating, operating or prescribing for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity
or physical condition.”200 In some states, like Ohio, “holding out of one’s self as
being engaged in the practice of medicine shall be regarded as practicing the
same,”201 such that advertising or claiming to the public “to be a practitioner of
medicine and surgery, or any of its branches”202 would be a violation. Thus,
CPCs’ diagnostic reproductive services and counseling would violate Ohio’s
statute. Of course, the state licensing board and local prosecutors would have to
decide that they wanted to bring such a claim, as there is not a private right of
action. This requires the political will of elected officials. But enforcing these
198. Oral Argument at 17:45, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(2018) (No. 16-1140), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140 [https://perma.cc/4HRK-9JQQ].
199. In the mid 1970s, several state courts upheld convictions of acupuncture practitioners for the
unauthorized practice of medicine, as the insertion of needles was considered minor surgery and the use
of needles to reduce pain constituted the practice of medicine. See People v. Amber, 349 N.Y.S.2d 604
(Sup. Ct. 1973); State v. Won, 528 P.2d 594 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Wilson, 528 P.2d 279 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1974). A Washington state court easily found that acupuncturists practiced medicine under the
plain language of the statute, as they “offer services to people with various afflictions and tell them they
can help them feel better.” See State v. Pac. Health Ctr., Inc., 143 P.3d 618, 626 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
Chiropractors have also been prosecuted for failing to comply with state licensing regulations when their
practice exceeded the scope of their permit or they used the title “physician” or “doctor,” which implied
graduation from an allopathic, accredited medical school. See State v. Rich, 339 N.E.2d 630, 632 (Ohio
1975).
200. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6521 (McKinney 2018).
201. State v. Farrand, 120 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
202. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.41 (West 2018).
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statutes does not pose any First Amendment challenges. Even an extremely
conservative and anti-regulation Supreme Court would struggle to wiggle out
from established precedent that permits this kind of regulation.
In 1889, in Dent v. West Virginia,203 the Supreme Court upheld a West
Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor to practice, or attempt to practice,
medicine without being qualified or a graduate of a reputable medical college.204
The punishment for each offense could include a $5,000 fine, or 12-months
imprisonment in the county jail.205 The prohibition on practicing medicine
without a proper degree or license was considered by the Supreme Court to be
within the state’s power to protect its citizens from the “consequences of
ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception and fraud.”206 Medical
licensing laws have also survived most constitutional challenges, specifically
claims of unconstitutional limitation of the free exercise of religion207 and
violations of due process.208 There are limits on regulation of the medical
profession.209 However, requiring medical licensure for clinics engaged in
medical services would almost certainly be upheld. The key, of course, would be
in making the threshold determination that CPCs are practicing medicine without
a license.
The penalties imposed for violating modern regulations vary from state to
state.210 In California,211 any person who practices “any system or mode of
treating the sick or afflicted” or who “diagnoses, treats, operates for, or
prescribes for any ailment, blemish, deformity, disease, disfigurement, disorder,
injury, or other physical or mental condition of any person” without a required
certificate may be liable for a fine of up to $10,000, imprisonment for a period
of up to one year, or both. In New Hampshire,212 on the other hand, violations
may be penalized by receiving a cease and desist order or a fine of up to

203. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
204. William P. Gunnar, The Scope of a Physician’s Medical Practice: Is the Public Adequately
Protected by State Medical Licensure, Peer Review, and the National Practitioner Data Bank?, 14
ANNALS HEALTH L. 329, 338 (2005). See also Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the
Regulation of Medical Practice: A Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board
Regulation of Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201,
214 (1999).
205. Dent, 129 U.S. at 232.
206. Id. at 122.
207. Smith v. People, 117 P. 612 (Colo. 1911).
208. Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1956).
209. A North Carolina law that required physicians to present pregnant women with a sonogram of
their fetus and describe the fetus in real-time, even if the woman actively “avert[s] her eyes” and
“refus[es] to hear,” was found to go beyond the extent permitted for reasonable regulation of the
medical profession, while simultaneously threatening harm to the patient’s psychological health,
interfering with the physician’s professional judgment, and compromising the doctor-patient
relationship. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242-45 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that the North Carolina
ultrasound law violated the First Amendment).
210. For an overview, see 118 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 215 (2018).
211. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2052 (Deering 2018).
212. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:24 (2018).
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$50,000.213 In Utah, practicing medicine without a license would generate a
meager civil money penalty of not more than $5,000,214 which again reflects the
weak political will of the state in enforcing these practices. Some of these fines
are modest enough that they might be easy for the CPCs to pay. Alternatively,
the state could pursue imprisonment in some states, like California, but this is
politically very unpopular and therefore quite unlikely. Given the type of
remedies involved, it is unsurprising that California has not yet chosen to
prosecute CPCs for the unlawful practice of medicine. The action is not likely to
yield meaningful consumer protection where CPCs can merely pay the fine or
obtain a medical license and continue to mislead.
Unlicensed CPCs may run afoul of the medical licensing laws of the state,
as the diagnosis of pregnancy, the discussion of prenatal care, and the use of
ultrasound imaging will easily constitute the practice of medicine.215 While
CPCs might employ volunteer nurses and physicians, they would need to be
licensed and in good standing in each state, and the facility itself would need to
be licensed as a medical facility.
B. New York Investigates CPCs for the Unauthorized Practice of Medicine
In May of 2013, the Attorney General of New York issued a subpoena on
Evergreen Association, which operates twelve CPCs in the New York City area.
The purpose of the investigatory subpoena was to determine whether the CPCs
were engaged in the unauthorized practice of medicine. A series of public
hearings conducted in 2010 and 2011 by the New York City Council found that
Evergreen “engaged in conduct which could constitute the unauthorized practice
of medicine, including evaluating fetal health and requesting the medical history
of clients.”216 Meanwhile, a televised news segment reported that “Evergreen
made diagnoses of gestational age and situated its centers in medical buildings
making them appear like medical offices.”217 The subpoena was meant to
uncover whether the CPCs should be fined, as they did not appear to have any
licensed medical staff.
Evergreen attempted to quash the subpoena as a politically motivated attack
on their constitutional right to advocate against abortion. It claimed that the
Attorney General lacked a factual basis for issuing the subpoena. In June 2017,
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York found that the
Attorney General had “amply demonstrate[d]” that a “legitimate factual basis

213. Id.
214. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-67-301 (West 2018).
215. 118 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 215 (2018). But see Albini v. Connecticut Med. Examining
Bd., 72 A.3d 1208, 1214 (Conn. App. 2013) (holding that midwifery assistance for normal pregnancies
does not constitute the practice of medicine).
216. Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 54 N.Y.S.3d 135, 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
217. Id.
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existed for the Attorney General to conduct his investigation and issue the
subpoena to determine whether Evergreen is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of medicine,” as he had adduced evidence “that Evergreen’s centers
were set up to look like medical offices, staff members were dressed in scrubs or
lab coats, a medical history was taken from clients, diagnoses of pregnancies,
ectopic pregnancies, and gestational age were made, and medical advice was
given, including false advice.”218
The investigation could proceed, but, because Evergreen is a CPC with
ideological roots, the court had to make sure the organization’s freedom of
speech and association were not unduly chilled. Therefore, the court limited the
scope of the document requests to ensure they were narrowly tailored to target
only Evergreen’s provision of medically-related services.219 The Attorney
General could not request documents about the overarching corporate structure
or funding of Evergreen Association, unless those individuals were related to the
provision of medical care.
The investigation by the Attorney General of New York is a step in the right
direction to protect the health of the women of New York. Given that many CPCs
provide confirmation of pregnancy and gestational age of the fetus and offer
prenatal vitamins, ultrasounds, and counseling on sexually transmitted
diseases,220 it is alarming that some continue to do this without having medically
licensed staff. There is great potential for substandard care and resulting harm,
as women delay seeing licensed clinicians. These are the precise kinds of risks
the state medical licensing statutes were drafted to address.
V. REGULATING CPCS BY CHALLENGING THE USE OF FDA-APPROVED
DEVICES IN UNAPPROVED WAYS
A. The Co-Opting of the Ultrasound Device
In theory, FDA enforcement could also provide a means for curbing CPCs’
deceptive practices. One of the chief ways that CPCs deceive pregnant women
is by advertising that they provide free ultrasounds. This is a major selling point,
especially for low-income women who seek their services. And given that the
biggest risk factor in failing to receive adequate prenatal care is poverty and lack
of insurance, this was precisely why California passed the FACT Act, requiring
disclosure of California’s state-funded pregnancy treatment options.221
218. Id. at 142.
219. Id. at 146.
220. Chen, supra note 5, at 936-37.
221. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 841 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The
California Legislature determined that a substantial number of California citizens may not be aware of,
or have access to, medical services relevant to pregnancy. This includes findings that in 2012, 2.6
million California women were in need of publicly-funded family-planning services, and that thousands
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Recognizing that their niche market was the underinsured, a CPC trainer advised
trainees to tell callers asking about abortion care that, while the CPC does not
offer abortion services, it does provide free ultrasounds that the woman will need
to have before she can get abortion care.222 From the pro-life perspective,
providing a guided ultrasound is “crucial to the explicit task of persuading the
woman not to abort.”223 The idea is based in part on an unproven premise that
women who abort their fetuses are doing so thoughtlessly. Once the woman sees,
via ultrasound, the heartbeat and perhaps the head, fingers, and toes of her fetus,
she will be forced to emotionally confront the life she is about to terminate and
will change her mind.
Pro-life advocates have relied heavily on the persuasive power of the
ultrasound. Twenty-six states have enacted some form of legislation that requires
a woman to obtain an ultrasound before terminating her pregnancy. Similar bills
have been introduced in many other states.224 In Kentucky, Louisiana, Texas,
and Wisconsin, state law requires that the abortion provider show the woman the
image on the ultrasound and describe it to her, even if she does not want to see
it.225 North Carolina passed a law that required physicians performing abortions
to display and describe the image during the ultrasound, even if the woman
actively “avert[s] her eyes” and “refus[es] to hear.”226 This “real-time view”
aspect of the law was challenged by physicians as compelled speech that violated
their First Amendment rights (and professional ethics). The Fourth Circuit
agreed that the “real-time view” part of the statute did not survive intermediate
scrutiny.227 It was critical to the Court’s holding that the North Carolina law not
allow physicians to deviate from the required disclosures or timing, even if, in
the physician’s professional judgment, she thought it was best to do so. Doctors
in Kentucky are likewise challenging their state’s informed consent to abortion
statute on similar First Amendment grounds.228 It will be interesting to see what
level of scrutiny the federal courts apply, in light of NIFLA and the Court’s
dismissal of intermediate review for professional speech. Either way, state
informed-consent laws that provide for the physician to deviate from the content
of pregnant California women remain unaware of the state-funded programs that offer an array of
services, such as health education and planning, prenatal care, and abortion.”).
222. Winter, Save the Mother, Save the Baby, An Inside Look at a Pregnancy Center Conference,
COSMOPOLITAN (April 6, 2015), http://cosmopolitan.com/politics/a38642/heartbeat-internationalconference-crisis-pregnancy-centers-abortion [https://perma.cc/Z9HA-RCFN].
223. Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected
Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 375 (2008).
224. See State Ultrasound Requirements in Abortion Procedures, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION,
https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/state-indicator/ultrasoundrequirements/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%
22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/76CN-5UJN].
225. Id.
226. 2011 N.C. SESS. LAWS 405.
227. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2014).
228. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 283 F. Supp. 3d 629, 632 (W.D. Ky. Sept.
27, 2017).
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of the required disclosure and timing if it is in her best medical judgment to do
so, seem much more likely to be upheld.229 Given that ultrasound is becoming a
prerequisite to obtaining an abortion, it is necessary to see what the FDA has to
say about its use in nonclinical settings, such as CPCs.
B. Ultrasounds are FDA-Approved Devices that Should Not Be Used in
Pseudo-Clinical Ways
Ultrasound is a medical technology that is regulated by the FDA. Ultrasound
provides a window into the anatomy of a fetus in utero, by sending sound waves
through soft tissue such as the pregnant belly. The sound waves bounce off the
tissue and render images of the size and structure of these organs and tissues,
including any abnormalities in fetal development.230 Ultrasound has become a
very important tool in obstetrics to confirm pregnancy, diagnose ectopic and
molar pregnancies, and reveal fetal disfigurement, fetal movements, and uterine
cysts or other abnormalities.231 Modern ultrasound technology employs higher
frequency sound waves that can show a moving 3-D image of the wiggling fetus.
While the technology is generally considered safe, prolonged non-clinical
exposure may have negative health effects.232 Ultrasound waves can heat the
tissues and produce small pockets of gas in body fluids or tissues.233 The longterm consequences of these effects are still unknown.234 Out of concern for the
negative health effects on the fetus, organizations such as the American Institute
of Ultrasound in Medicine have advocated for “prudent use” of ultrasound during
pregnancy, and have discouraged it from being used off-label. In addition to the
biological effects of ultrasound on the pregnant woman and fetus, there are also
health risks from inadequately trained staff or poorly maintained equipment.235
Even with the 3-D advancements, ultrasound images require skill to be
interpreted correctly and meaningfully. This is especially true in early
pregnancy, when capturing the correct angles is difficult and the rendered images
may be quite ambiguous to the untrained eye. Given the skill required to capture

229. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 254.
230. 75 AM. JUR. TRIALS 55 Ultrasound (Sonography) § 49 (2018).
231. Sanger, supra note 223, at 369.
232. See Information for Patients including Expectant Mothers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug.
29, 2018) https://www.fda.gov/RadiationEmittingProducts/RadiationEmittingProductsandProcedures/MedicalImaging/ucm115357.htm#industry
[https://perma.cc/GZR4-Y2VY] (“While ultrasound is generally considered to be safe with very low
risks, the risks may increase with unnecessary prolonged exposure to ultrasound energy, or when
untrained users operate the device.”).
233. Avoid Fetal “Keepsake” Images, Heartbeat Monitors, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 16,
2016), https://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/consumerupdates/ucm095508.htm [https://perma.cc/FVP3PGBE].
234. See Information for Patients including Expectant Mothers, supra note 232.
235. Jennifer M. Uhles, Unsound Ultrasounds? An Examination of State Legislation Regulating
Non-Medical Ultrasound Use and Private Ownership, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 263, 264 (2007).
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and interpret the images, it is shocking that many CPCs lack trained or licensed
radiological technicians. The lack of training of CPC staff can harm pregnant
women and their fetuses.
The most obvious potential harm is that women assume, incorrectly, that
their babies are healthy after having the ultrasound performed. This risk was first
identified when “keepsake ultrasound” studios such as Fetal Fotos opened in
malls around the country. Women assumed the photographer would tell them if
they saw something abnormal in the image.236 However, some photographers
boldly announced that “they will ignore fetal abnormalities even if a fetus has
three legs.”237
In one instance, a woman went to a keepsake imaging studio and left
believing her baby was healthy. She later discovered at her OB/GYN clinic that
her baby had significant fetal anomalies that were consistent with Trisomy 18
and Smith-Lemli-Opitz Syndrome. These abnormalities were visible earlier, but
went undetected or unreported by the operator at the fetal keepsake studio.238
Ignoring these defects and not reporting them seems cruel, until you realize that
the photographers are probably not very experienced in reading these images and
are also trying to insulate themselves from claims of medical malpractice or the
unauthorized practice of medicine. There are many instances of clinicians being
sued for medical malpractice over improper capture or interpretation of
ultrasound images.239 Whatever line remains between keepsake studios and
clinical practice must be defended by these businesses.
If the keepsake imaging studio were held to a medical standard of care, it
could be liable for negligence for failure to report significant clinical findings.
However, given that these entities are purely commercial and make no claims
about diagnosing disorders, the consumers are poorly protected from the false
sense of security they receive. There is significant risk of psychological injury,
as well as the potential to neglect more rigorous clinical follow-up if they assume
the fetus is healthy. Unfortunately, we will probably never know the extent of
the harm done by these keepsake ultrasound studios, as they are unlikely to report
their findings to any public health agencies.240
While the practices at keepsake ultrasound studios are troubling, the risk that
the consumer will misinterpret the nature of the ultrasound is much more
profound at a pseudo-clinic, such as a CPC. If you are visiting a strip mall and
realize you are paying for a “fun” and “novel” ultrasound experience in an
obviously non-clinical setting, your expectations differ significantly from the

236. Archie A. Alexander, “Just Scanning Around” with Diagnostic Medical Ultrasound: Should
States Regulate the Non-Diagnostic Uses of This Technology?, 16 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 8 (2007).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 7.
239. LaRose v. Washington University, 154 S.W.3d 365 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004. See also 75 AM. JUR.
TRIALS 55 (2018).
240. Alexander, supra note 236, at 7-8.
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expectations of women entering a CPC. As discussed previously, CPCs
deliberately mislead women into thinking they are seeing a nurse or doctor at a
proper health clinic. Given the heightened risk of misperception, it is much less
ethical for CPCs to employ ideological and unlicensed staff to interpret
ultrasound images.
C. States and the FDA Could Prohibit the Use of Ultrasound by Unlicensed
CPCs
Louisiana has attempted to eliminate off-label, non-clinical ultrasound
screening by defining them as an unauthorized practice of medicine under
Louisiana law.241 California already protects somewhat against the use of
ultrasound technology for non-approved uses. In 2009, the California legislature
passed a bill that requires certain disclosures before ultrasound is used for nonclinical purposes. Specifically, the consumer must be told “that the FDA has
determined the use of medical ultrasound equipment for reasons other than
medical purposes or without a physician’s prescription is an unapproved use of
medical technology.”242 Unfortunately, despite their ability to do so, state and
federal regulatory agencies have not enforced any actions against keepsake
ultrasound studios or CPCs based on their provision of ultrasounds.243
FDA discourages the use of ultrasound in a non-clinical setting by those who
are not trained in its use or interpretation. While off-label uses of devices may
be allowed under the supervision of a physician and within tight statutory
conditions, the use by non-clinicians such as unlicensed CPCs or keepsake
studios is clearly an unapproved off-label use.244 In addition to regulating how
the device may be used, the FDA has also deemed the promotion of unapproved
uses of a device to be a violation of FDA regulations, and the training of CPC
staff for an unapproved use would be “illegal promotional activity.”245 FDA
could require that CPCs employ trained ultrasound technicians and comply with
clinical guidelines. Ultimately, the FDA has the authority to shut keepsakeimaging studios down. However, given the limited resources available for

241. Under the bill as proposed, any person who administers an ultrasound upon a pregnant woman
without an order or referral shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. The bill included an exception for
individuals who are licensed to practice medicine, as well as licensed advanced practice nurses and
licensed physician assistants. See La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, Statement of Position, Self-Referred
Diagnostic Ultrasound Screening (Oct. 25, 2000),
https://www.lsbme.la.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Statements%20of%20Position/UltrasoundScreen
ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H5A-HBSK] (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
242. Uhles, supra note 235, at 270.
243. Alexander, supra note 236, at 9-10.
244. The allowed “off-label” uses assume that a “health care practitioner” will be prescribing the
legally marketed device “to a patient” for a disease or condition “within a legitimate health care
practitioner-patient relationship.” 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2018).
245. JAMES T. O’REILLY AND KATHARINE A. VAN TASSEL, 2 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. § 18:94 (4th
ed., 2018).
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enforcement at the FDA, senior agency officials appear to have opted to focus
their attention on more high-risk devices.246
CONCLUSION: RECLAIMING INFORMED CONSENT IN THE ABORTION CONTEXT
By suggesting that women bring battery causes of action against unlicensed
CPCs, this Article advocates for returning informed consent law to its ethical and
legal roots. Informed consent doctrine surrounding abortion has been perverted
by state TRAP laws, which have blurred the lines between ideology and
medicine. The majority opinion in NIFLA exacerbates this troubling trend. When
physicians are required to share misinformation with their patients seeking
abortion, or when CPCs exploit the medical model, this does violence to the
sanctity of the physician-patient relationship.247 It erodes trust and sullies the
professional reputation of all physicians. Even where abortion providers follow
up the mandatory disclosures with disclaimers that “I only shared that
information because I have to by law, not because I believe it,” there is still
confusion. Does the physician speak for the government, or can she be trusted to
protect her patients’ best interests? What does it mean if the physician is telling
the patient things that she herself does not believe? Is anything objective in
medicine, or is it all up for debate?
CPCs are exploiting the professional respect of physicians and the existing
framework of informed consent to shoehorn ideology through medicine.
Through TRAP laws and the deceptive practices of CPCs, the pro-life
community is eroding the distinction between a clinic and a pseudo-clinic, and
between politics and patient care. This could have sweeping negative impacts on
the practice of medicine, and also on women’s health. Women who visit CPCs
may delay being seen by actual doctors and might assume incorrectly that the
CPC staff are held to a professional standard of care. This could impose
significant health risks both on the pregnant woman and the fetus.
In the context of physician-assisted suicide, the Supreme Court has
recognized that states have an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession.248 This should also be true in the context of abortion
providers. Recall that the Casey plurality stated that “the doctor-patient relation
here is entitled to the same solicitude it receives in other contexts.”249 This

246. Id. § 18.1.
247. “The relationship between a patient and physician is based on trust, which gives rise
to physicians’ ethical responsibility to place patients’ welfare above the physician’s own self-interest or
obligations to others, to use sound medical judgments on patients’ behalf, and to advocate for their
patients’ welfare.” See Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 1.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.amaassn.org/delivering-care/patient-physician-relationships [https://perma.cc/2XDC-8ATB] (last visited
Nov. 19, 2018).
248. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997).
249. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
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message has sadly been lost on many state legislators, eager to pass TRAP laws
that pervert the ethical principles of patient autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. Physicians should be allowed to have political voices.
So, too, should pro-life activists. But each should have their policy debates, and
win or lose them, in the political sphere. The sacred relationship between the
physician and patient should not be leveraged for ideological gains.
At present, the law is lopsided. The First Amendment protects the CPCs’
deceptive practices not in spite of but because they are pseudo-clinics, motivated
not by commercial or professional interest but by ideology. Indeed, an automechanic or plumber, and certainly a licensed health care facility, is legally
prohibited from deceiving customers in the way that the CPCs do. And yet
precisely because the clinic is not a clinic at all, its deceptive practices are
afforded the greatest possible protection as ideological free speech. This is an
absurd outcome, given how underhanded CPCs are about revealing their
ideological underpinnings.
To correct this imbalance, it would have been wise for the Supreme Court
to adopt the perspective of the objective listener of the compelled disclosures
when determining how to classify CPCs’ speech. This would have been a better
way to balance the free speech rights of organizations against the public’s need
to understand who exactly is speaking to them. Political organizations such as
CPCs should not be allowed to hide behind their ideology to deceive
unsuspecting individuals. Unfortunately, at present this is not a practical
solution. It is not reasonable to expect injured women to wait until the Supreme
Court revisits or overrules its NIFLA precedent.
There are already tools at the disposal of our prosecutors and agency
regulators which can help to provide some protection for pregnant women.
Consumer protection statutes could restrict the deceptive advertising practices of
CPCs. State laws prohibiting the unauthorized practice of medicine could be
enforced, as New York’s attorney general is attempting to do. FDA enforcement
actions could chip away at the CPC’s use of FDA-approved medical devices in
non-approved ways. But each of these existing tools requires the political will of
elected and appointed officials. And so far, there are very few of these leaders
who are willing to spend the political capital to protect pregnant women from
deceptive CPCs. This has left the injured pregnant women with very little
recourse.
Following basic tort remedies of compensatory damages, these injured
pregnant women should be compensated for their pain and suffering, any
resulting lost wages or income, and any other reasonable financial damages that
stem from the battery, such as increased medical expenses from delayed
diagnosis of pregnancy complications, or even wrongful death if the CPC’s
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conduct results in the unwanted death of the fetus.250 Additionally, where the
CPCs deliberately defrauded these women to gain access to their bodies, these
women would also be good candidates for punitive damages, which would help
to fund the litigation and attorney’s fees.
We must fight to reclaim informed consent. It is not a meaningless tool to
shoehorn ideology through. It is not an amorphous concept, which allows a
pseudo-clinic to make a woman think she is being treated medically, when she
is actually being persuaded to submit to a religious ideology. By returning to the
roots of the informed consent doctrine, suing for the intentional tort of battery,
victims of the misleading practice of CPCs can obtain personal redress. In the
absence of proper public enforcement, tort law emerges as our last and best
resort. And while tort law is scattershot and ex post, it can nonetheless provide
meaningful and necessary regulation of CPCs’ deceptive behavior.

250. For the same reasons discussed above related to “wrongful birth” claims, supra pp.44-45 and
notes 195-197, states are not likely to allow for damages from the resulting birth of a child, even where
the CPC’s deceptive practices led a woman to delay receiving an abortion until after it is prohibited by
the state.
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